




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Mechanism of Strategic Decision Making in Emergency Situations of Terrorist Attacks in Indonesia

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Abstract. Terrorism is a global phenomenon experienced by all countries including Indonesia, manifested in terrorist attacks that involve violence as a main element with the motivation to achieve political, ideological, and certain belief goals. The threat of potential massive terrorist attacks continues to evolve to this day. Each era shows a tendency in terms of ideology and also types of terrorist attacks. In different times, it is not impossible to have the potential for attacks in different forms. Terrorist attacks that occur in a country can pose a threat to the stability of all aspects of life, thus requiring competent handling by looking at how the mechanism of strategic decision making in Indonesia faces emergency situations of terrorist attacks. Reflecting on the experience of handling the Bali Bombing I, this research was conducted with a qualitative approach based on literature studies and interviews with sources consisting of academics, practitioners, and strategic observers in the issue of terrorism using rational choice theory and criminal policy as the basis for writing. Through the study conducted, the authors found that although Indonesia has experience in handling terrorist actions, the readiness from the capacity aspect needs to be matured, especially in dealing with terrorist attacks. Therefore, a strategic and uncomplicated decision-making mechanism needs to be formulated immediately through a clear command flow or delegation of authority that applies when emergency conditions of terrorist attacks occur.

Keywords. Terrorism, Terrorist Attacks, Emergency Situations, Criminal Policy, Rational Choice

1. Introduction

Terrorism is a global phenomenon that continues to evolve to this day. Definitions of terrorism are available from various perspectives. In the perspective of Criminology, terrorism is considered a form of crime or deviant behavior that involves the use of unlawful means, usually involving violence with specific political and ideological goals (Miller, 2009). Terrorist attacks, as manifestations of terrorism, aim to instill fear in society and threaten the welfare and social functions of the community through various types of violence (Baikady, 2022). The existence of terrorist attacks continues to spread every day and causes. Threats that are more serious leading to chaotic conditions (Çoban, 2021; Braziel, et al., 2016). The existence of terrorism and terrorist attacks can be seen from the history of its development, starting from the wave of anarchy (1879-1920s), the anti-colonial wave (1919-1960s), the new left wave (1960s-1990s), to the religious wave (1979-2020s) (Rapoport, 2022). Until now, religious-based

terrorist attacks have occurred in various countries and caused many casualties, such as the terrorist attack by Al-Qaeda on the World Trade Center in New York (Rapoport, 2022), the use of sarin gas by the Aum Shinrikyo group in Japan (Box & McCormack, 2004), the terrorist attack in Mumbai (Kolås, 2010), the truck incident in Nice, France (Carroll & Collingburn, 2016), the attack on the Dusit hotel in Kenya (Jirásek, 2023), and the shooting at the Christchurch mosque, New Zealand (Every-Palmer et al., 2021).


In the context of Indonesia, the terrorist attacks that occurred are also inseparable from the existence of a religious basis. According to the Global Terrorism Database (2021), from 1970 to 2021, Indonesia experienced around 1000 cases of terrorism, with the highest occurring from 2000 to 2004. The highest case at that time was the Bali Bombing I in 2002, which involved a religious-based terrorist network, namely Jemaah Islamiyah, which has connections with Al-Qaeda. These terrorist attacks had a significant impact on Indonesia, ranging from physical, psychological, material, and state losses in the economic sector. After the Bali Bombing I in 2002, a number of terrorist attacks continued to occur in the form of bomb explosions, such as at the Australian Embassy in 2004, the Bali Bombing II in 2005, and at the JW Marriott in 2009. Based on various bombing incidents, it is not impossible that the threat of terrorist attacks in other forms will occur in the future.

In addition to religious-based terrorist attacks, the interpretation of terrorist attacks has begun to shift, for example, in the form of separatist terrorism, as has occurred in Indonesia. This is in line with the statement from Mahfud MD, who emphasized that armed groups that commit massive violence in Papua and West Papua are terrorists (Madrim, 2021). Terrorist attacks carried out by lone wolf terrorists (Arifin, 2023) and former terrorist convicts (Affan, 2022) that occurred in Indonesia have also become a point of concern. Furthermore, terrorist attacks in Indonesia also do not rule out the possibility of developing into CBRNE attacks (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive) (Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia, 2015). The development regarding the interpretation of terrorist attacks shows that terrorist attacks is dynamic. It is also mass-based and has varying levels of damage. However, more than that, fundamentally, terrorist attacks are deliberately designed to provide a psychological effect on the masses so that they feel extreme fear towards the perpetrators (Schmid, 2011). When society is plagued by fear, economic activities will be disrupted and social cohesion weakens due to distrust among each other.

This journal will discuss further how the mechanism of strategic decision-making in emergency situations of terrorist attacks in Indonesia. Based on previous studies, several journals only focus on how emergency responses related to terrorist attacks impact health aspects (Phelps, 2020; Wurmb, et al., 2020; Hendrix & Young, 2014). In addition, several literature studies discussing terrorist attacks in Indonesia have not found discussions regarding the decision-making mechanism in emergency situations of terrorist attacks (Ulandari, Swastanto, & Sihole, 2019; Dampang, 2019).

The author argues that there is a gap in the discussion related to the mechanism of strategic decision-making, as a form of response, in facing emergency situations of terrorist attacks, especially in Indonesia. The novelty of this research is the decision-making mechanism in emergency situations of terrorist attacks from various perspectives, and the author will align it with Indonesia's experience in facing emergency situations of terrorist attacks.

Schema 1 Framework of Thinking



Source: Processed by the Author.

The issue of terrorism and terror attacks is an important matter to discuss due to its ongoing existence that continues to develop to this day. This journal will focus on discussing the phenomenon of terrorism and terror attacks in Indonesia. Furthermore, this journal will also discuss how the Indonesian state, in this case the government, responds to the terror attacks that have occurred, namely the Bali Bombing I event in 2002 as a significant moment for Indonesia in facing terror attacks. In the final section, this journal discusses the idea of a strategic decision-making mechanism in facing emergency situations of terror attacks in Indonesia through the framework of rational choice theory and criminal policy.

2. Method

The author uses a qualitative approach that is used to answer questions related to the development of understanding about the meaning and dimensions of human life experiences and the social world (Fossey, et al., 2002). The qualitative approach can provide space for a deeper understanding in the interpretation of a matter (Creswell, 2014). The phenomenon of terrorism is a complex matter related to social context and a number of unpredictable variables. Therefore, research with a qualitative approach can be used to explain the existence of complex interactions among these various variables. The qualitative approach used in discussing the issue of terrorism is capable of providing a more comprehensive understanding of the mechanisms underlying it (Borum, 2011).

In this journal, the author uses data sources obtained from direct interviews with several informants who are experts in handling issues related to terrorism, ranging from historical actors directly involved in terror events in Indonesia, practitioners, academics, and strategic observers. In addition, the author also conducts observations and reviews from various literature as supporting data, such as books, previous scientific journals, news, notes, or reports from various sources related to terrorism and terror attacks. To delve deeper into the strategic decision-making mechanisms in emergency situations due to terror attacks in Indonesia, the author uses a case study research type, where the research explores various examples of real events or cases experienced by Indonesia.

3. Results

3.1 The Phenomenon of Terrorism and Terror Attacks in Indonesia

Although there is no fully agreed definition of terrorism (Shafritz, Gibbons, Scott, 1991), Moghaddam (2005) attempts to define terrorism as an act involving violence against civilians resulting in a large number of deaths. Terrorism can be distinguished from other acts of violence based on the motivational element, namely to achieve political, ideological, or certain belief goals with the willingness to use violence (Clarke & Newman, 2006). Terrorism is not only considered an act of violence that endangers a group of people, but can also threaten democratic institutions, weaken the economy, and create instability in a region (Tilly, 2015).

From a criminological perspective, terrorism is viewed as a form of crime or deviant behavior that involves the use of unlawful means, usually involving violence directed at civilians, for political-ideological purposes (Miller, 2009). Terrorism can be defined as the planned use or threat of violence by individuals or groups to achieve political goals through intimidation of the broader public. Two important elements in this definition are the existence or threat of violence and political motivation. Acts of violence without political motivation are considered crimes, not terrorism. Terrorists seek to create widespread fear to exert pressure on the government to meet their demands (Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2019).

In Jackson (2016), the definition of terrorism can be viewed from several perspectives, for example (1) the objectivist perspective, terrorism as a form of real violence with objective characteristics that can be identified epistemologically and (2) the subjectivist perspective, terrorism depends on who is observing or can be said to be a form of social construction. In defining terrorism, there are several important components, namely violence, danger and threat; randomness; fear and intimidation; psychological coercion; political motivation; unlawful violence by non-state actors; attacks on civilians (Jackson, 2016). Based on a number of definitions of terrorism, the author agrees that the concept of terrorism at least involves elements of violence that are motivated by certain political and ideological goals. In defining the typology of terrorism, this journal will focus on several forms, namely new terrorism, international terrorism, and religious terrorism (Martin, 2017).

Terror attacks, as a form of terrorism, can occur in various forms and continue to evolve to this day. The development of terror attacks can be seen from the emergence of various forms of modus operandi from the perpetrators. The biggest threat arising from terrorism today is the increased use of modern technology, including the potential adoption of cyber technology in terror attacks (Iftikhar, 2024). Another threat faced is terror attacks using Weapons of Mass Destruction related to dangerous biological, chemical, and nuclear materials (Okoro & Oluka, 2019). With the development of these forms of terror attacks, handling is needed through approaches appropriate to the type of attack and its context (Galatas, et al., 2022). Handling emergency conditions due to terror attacks requires quick and precise strategic decision-making to provide command to resources that are deployed directly to the location when the terror attack occurs. Certainly, collaborative efforts involving various government agencies, security forces, and medical services are also needed in order to reduce the risks and impacts of terror attacks (Galatas, et al., 2022).

In this journal, the concept of terrorism and terror attacks is viewed as a global threat whose existence continues to evolve to this day, so the mechanism of strategic decision-making by the government, especially Indonesia, at the time of a terror attack (during the attack) becomes an important issue to discuss further, especially in facing unexpected attacks. This journal will discuss one of the terror attacks in Indonesia, namely the Bali Bombing I that occurred in 2002. Before this event occurred, the situation in Indonesia, especially Bali at that time, had experienced instability as a result of the Poso and Ambon riots, which also became

the motive for revenge by the terrorists for the many Muslims who were killed. The Bali Bombing incident was also based on the feelings of brotherhood of the Afghan people who became victims of American oppression. The selection of Bali as the location for the bomb to be detonated was due to the collective assumption of the group that Bali was a center of immorality and a location that was irrelevant to Islamic teachings. In addition, Bali was chosen because it matched the profile of locations that were targets for terrorists.

When the Bali Bombing I attack occurred, chaos erupted at 23:05 WITA at Paddy's Pub and Sari Club, Jalan Legian, Kuta, Bali, with 200 fatalities and 200 others injured, both severely and lightly. Then, another explosion occurred in Renon, near the United States Consulate, although there were no casualties in that incident. The political situation when the Bali Bombing occurred showed a lack of conducive conditions with no regulatory framework in responding to terrorism, according to a statement from one of the strategic observers in Indonesia who stated that when Bali Bombing I happened, we did not have any framework for counter-terrorism and did not anticipate a major attack occurring in Bali (Widjajanto, personal interview, 2024).

3.2 Emergency Moment: Indonesia Government's Response during Bali Bomb I Terror Attack

Through the Bali Bombing I attack, the government realized the need for legal urgency in responding to the terrorist attack, leading to the birth of Perppu number 1 of 2002, which was retroactively enforced through the activation of regulations set forth in Perppu number 2 of 2002 as the legal basis for combating acts of terrorism. When the Bali Bombing I occurred, there was no special unit functioning to respond to terrorist attacks at that time because the urgency for a terrorism response agency was considered not significant at that time, compounded by the formation of a draft law that was less conducive to counter-terrorism. This was further explained through the words of a practitioner in Indonesia who stated that Indonesia still considered terrorists to be far away at that time, as the terrorism that received attention at that time was limited to the international 9/11 incident involving terrorist attacks in the United States.

a. Credible sources.

The condition of Indonesia that is considered fine and far from terrorism changed when an explosion occurred in Bali where the police did not have a special unit to pursue and encourage the birth of Densus 88 AT (Fahrizal, personal interview, 2024).

The implication of the delay in forming a special unit in responding to terrorism is the slow response in handling, especially in the evacuation of victims and securing the area, as well as the lack of effective coordination between various agencies such as the police, military, and health institutions, resulting in delays in taking action. This, according to Widjajanto (2024, personal interview), is due to the use of the 101% doctrine experience in Indonesia, where we act as a response to incidents and is shown through a criminal approach that waits for a bomb to occur first before thinking about how to proceed. Thus, it can be concluded that the handling mechanism in responding to terrorism is still considered inadequate with crisis management deemed poor due to communication to the public that seems lacking, resulting in panic and uncertainty in emergency situations after the Bali Bomb I.

3.3. The Idea of Strategic Decision-Making Mechanism in Emergency Terror Attack Situations in Indonesia

Based on the tendency of terrorist attacks to cause widespread impacts—from social, political, to psychological—some authors equate it with disasters that can lead to crises or emergency conditions (Meade & Molander, 2006; Waugh, Jr. & Streib, 2006) as stated in

Government Regulation in Lieu of Law Number 23 of 1959 regarding civil and military emergencies and who takes over. However, this regulation has never been enacted into law, so terrorist attacks in the form of rebellions or emergencies do not yet have a legal basis for their handling. This means we do not yet have emergency framework rules in handling terrorism when the Bali Bomb I occurred at that time (Andi Widjajanto, 2024, personal interview).

Reflecting on Indonesia's experience in facing terrorist attacks, such as the Bali Bomb I incident that occurred in October 2002, shows that the Indonesian government has not yet had a decision-making mechanism that capable to encounter the terrorism itself. This can be seen from the sequence of time constraint of terrorist attacks, starting from prior intelligence, attack, and aftermath. From the side of prior intelligence, before the occurrence of the terrorist attack in August 2002, Hamzah Haz (Vice President of the Republic of Indonesia 1999-2004) denied allegations that Indonesia was a haven for terrorists. He also emphasized that the government had not found indications of terrorism in the homeland (Liputan6, 2002). This statement emerged just two months before the Bali Bombing I event, which occurred in October 2002. This shows that the aspect of prior intelligence from the Indonesian government at that time was less responsive or inaccurate in seeing the threat of terrorism.

Then at the time the terrorist attack occurred (attack), namely at the time of the bombing, the initial response from the government and security apparatus can also be said to be slow and there was no clear coordination flow in handling the emergency conditions resulting from the terrorist attack. Furthermore, from the side of aftermath, Indonesia has a policy vacuum regulating the handling of the impacts of terrorist attacks. This is evidenced by the fact that a legal basis was only formed after the occurrence of the terrorist attack, namely in the form of Government Regulation in Lieu of Law (Perppu) No. 1 of 2002 concerning the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism, which was then ratified into Law No. 15 of 2003 effective in September 2003, and Government Regulation in Lieu of Law (Perppu) No. 2 of 2002 concerning the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism with retroactive nature, which was then ratified into Law No. 16 of 2003 effective on September 30, 2003, which regulates the ratification of Perppu Number 1 of 2002 in the case of Bali Bombing I to become law.

Based on these issues, this journal will focus on how the mechanism of strategic decision-making in facing emergency conditions of terrorist attacks can be applied in Indonesia by taking one case example, namely the Bali Bombing 1 attack. This is important to discuss because without an effective and efficient decision-making mechanism, the community may lose a sense of security and various aspects of daily life may experience disturbances. When the state, in this case, the government, cannot make timely and sustainable decisions, an emergency situation that has the potential to lead to the formation of a failed state. In facing emergency conditions of terrorist attacks, the Indonesian government must also be able to adapt along with the development of terrorist attacks. The urgency of decision-making in handling terrorist attacks is fundamental due to its massive and prolonged impact. Thus, the seriousness of the government is needed to have an effective decision-making mechanism when emergency conditions of terrorist attacks occur or what can be defined as political will. Against stopping there, in formulating a decision-making mechanism for a country, the involvement of certain concepts and theories is necessary, among them are:


A. Strategic Decision Making

Decisions can be defined as the result of a problem-solving process that is being faced by answering the question of what should be done with the aim of addressing the problem. In a decision, there is an effort to determine or establish one of the problem-solving efforts from the various alternative choices available (Hasan, et al., 2023). Decision-making, in general, can be

understood as the result of thinking about various alternatives that will then be implemented to solve problems within an organization. Strategic decision-making aims to control how the arrangements related to resources are used effectively and efficiently, as well as how operational units carry out their tasks (Hasan, et al., 2023).

In a decision-making process, a model is needed as one of its foundations. A model is a representation of the entire system constructed in the study of how the system works, focusing on representing existing phenomena, not explaining like a theory (Bhattacharjee, A., 2024). One of the decision-making models is the rational model. Decision-makers must know exactly the goals to be achieved and then determine the steps to be taken to achieve those goals (Wahjono, 2022). Decision-makers obtain information and develop a number of alternatives and choose the most optimal alternative. This perspective is used in the decision-making process for two reasons, namely (1) the assumption that decision makers are rational, (2) every activity that will be taken must be based on logical reasons. The rational model in decision making proposes that policymakers go through certain stages logically to achieve the best possible policy decision. In decision making, there are at least four stages that are carried out (Simon, 1977): (1) Intelligence, which is the stage of data and information collection in identifying problems, (2) Design, which is the formulation of solutions to problems in the form of solution options, (3) Choice, which is the stage of selecting decisions based on existing options, and (4) Implementation, which is the stage of executing decisions and evaluating the results.

Schema 2 Steps of Decision Making



Source: Processed by the Author

In emergency conditions, incorrect decisions can have very serious consequences due to the unstable nature of emergencies. Decision making in emergency conditions can have three limitations (Cosgrave, 1996). First, there is a time constraint that requires decisions to be made as soon as possible. Second, there are limitations in information both in terms of quality and quantity. Third, there is a heavy decision burden, especially due to critical time constraints and based on very limited information. Therefore, each emergency situation is different, so universally applicable decision making in emergencies cannot be effectively implemented (Cosgrave, 1996). In relation to this journal, strategic decision making during emergency conditions due to terrorist attacks must be adjusted to the specific conditions that occur. In other words, strategic decision making in emergency conditions of terrorist attacks can be carried out. Through a specific and adaptive approach, considering the complexity and uncertainty that accompany it.

B. Criminal Policy

Criminal policy refers to a set of laws, procedures, and practices implemented by the government and other authorities to prevent, deter, and respond to criminal behavior. The goal

of criminal policy is to maintain social order, protect society from harm, and ensure that those who violate the law are held accountable for their actions to achieve the welfare of the community (Kenedi, 2017). In addressing crime within the concept of criminal policy, it is done through the application of criminal law, non-criminal prevention, and also influencing public views on crime and punishment through mass media.

In a narrower view, criminal policy can be defined as all principles and methods that form the basis of reactions to efforts to combat crime. To confront terrorism, there are several criminal policies that can be implemented, which are not limited to legal approaches but can also be accompanied by non-legal approaches (Zaidan, 2017). As a reaction to terrorist attacks, the state has the authority and resources to respond to emergencies. In this journal, the concept of criminal policy focuses more on the existence of procedural forms that regulate the mechanisms for handling emergency conditions at the time of a terrorist attack. The author believes that policies as a form of handling terrorist attack conditions should not be permanent. In other words, policies must be able to adjust to the developments of the issues faced. Policy-making must be responsive to developments in the public agenda being faced (Durant & Diehl, 1989).

C. Rational Choice Theory

Rational choice theory is one of the criminology theories introduced by Clarke & Cornish. The concept of rationality is at the core. From this theory that refers to the role of reasoning in human behavior. Through the lens of this theory, crime is seen as a result of individual thinking that considers the benefits and losses of criminal actions taken (Clarke & Cornish, 1985). With this consideration, the perpetrator conducts an analysis of costs and benefits (Becker, 2007). Rational choice theory is used to model social, economic, and individual behavior. The theory states that when faced with various choices, individuals tend to choose actions that they consider best and potentially yield the most beneficial outcomes (Ogu, 2013).

In the context of government, Stephen M. Walt (Krismayanti et al., 2022) explains that rational choice theory is used to generate decisions made by policymakers (actors). An actor or policymaker will choose the option that provides maximum benefit. Rational choice, as explained, requires careful calculations related to profit and loss. Rational considerations play an important role in decision-making and policy. Rational policy decisions will combine the best available scientific evidence—usually provided by expert opinions and modeling studies. However, in uncertain and rapidly changing environments, the relevant evidence is very fluid, so what is needed is not only the calculation of the impact of a single decision but also calculations regarding alternative actions and their impacts (Berger et al., 2021). In this journal, rational choice theory is used to explain that a decision-making mechanism in Indonesia during a state of emergency due to a terrorist attack must certainly be based on rationality.

3.4 Ideas on the Decision-Making Mechanism in the United States Based on the 9/11 Incident

In decision-making in the United States related to the terrorist attack incident on September 11, 2001, or more commonly known as the 9/11 tragedy, there are a number of steps taken by the U.S. government to restoring national security and conditions that are conducive in the country. Several things that need to be understood are that the implementation of this mechanism is based on the application of the concept of strategic decision-making while prioritizing the application of rational choice theory and criminal policy.

When the 9/11 attacks occurred, the United States did not receive any intelligence regarding the terrorism that took place. However, despite this, the government at that time took swift action by immediately implementing a legal basis in the form of the Patriot Act's ratification in October 2001, which granted authority to collect information, conduct wiretaps, and monitor activities suspected of being related to terrorism to several law enforcement agencies, such as the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which was newly established in November 2002 as the agency responsible for preventing future terrorist attacks. This aims to address the intelligence challenges that the United States was unable to obtain concerning 9/11.

Prioritizing rational choice theory and criminal policy, America, which received hate speech from organizations formed by Osama Bin Laden with the issuance of the World Islamic Front fatwa aimed at exterminating American citizens, immediately declared the Global War on Terror (GWOT) policy and the declaration of a national emergency in the United States at present. As a further effort, America also deployed its troops to invade Afghanistan to destroy Al-Qaeda, which was responsible for the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Through the highest government channels led by the President as the decision-maker in emergency situations of terrorist attacks, one of the other strategies employed by the United States is to strengthen international cooperation as an effort to effectively respond to international terrorism in the future.

In addition, America also conducted arrests of individuals suspected of being involved in the 9/11 actions through information gathered from intelligence from other countries and strengthened security within the United States immigration system. To strengthen the picture of the strategic decision-making mechanism in the United States, the following comparison table is presented:

1. Comparison of the Implementation of the Strategic Decision-Making Mechanism in the United States and Indonesia.

No	Aspect	Indonesia	United States
1	Security	Response security that slow to the incident terror in the absence of a special institution in handling of terror attacks when the first Bali Bomb occurred	Quick response with the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as the agency responsible for future terrorist attacks.
2	Intelligence	No existence information intelligence which accepted before attack terror occurred and no further efforts were made besides expect help other countries to overcome impact from the terrorist attacks that occurred.	In the 9/11 incident, no intelligence was received by the United States, but there were quick actions through the passage of the Patriot Act in October 2001 that granted authority to collect information, conduct wiretaps, and monitor activities suspected of being related to terrorism to several law enforcement agencies, such as the FBI and CIA.

3	Government and regulation	<p>No existence channel coordination which clear in handle condition emergency consequence the terrorist attack.</p> <p>Regulation legislation as a legal basis in responding to new terrorist attacks formed after the incident occurred with the existence of a gap in legitimacy (Perppu No. 1 Year 2002) because it was not ratified into Law.</p>	<p>On the day of the attack, the President of the United States at that time ordered the NSC (National Security Council) to coordinate responses with the Counter Terrorism Center at the CIA to obtain intelligence sources regarding the perpetrators of the attacks from around the world.</p> <p>The establishment of a national state of emergency and issuing the Global War on Terror (GWOT) policy which has implications for the arrest of individuals suspected of being involved in the 9/11 incident as well as the invasion carried out in Afghanistan to destroy Al-Qaeda responsible for the 9/11 terrorist attacks.</p> <p>Strengthening international cooperation as an effort to respond to international terrorism effectively in the future.</p>
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4. Conclusion

In responding to the terrorist attack that occurred in Indonesia during the Bali Bombing I, there was chaos in terms of economy, politics, and social aspects. In facing an emergency attack, there were several responses taken by the state, especially in issuing Government Regulation in Lieu of Law number 1 of 2002, which became the basis for the eradication of criminal acts, and was subsequently ratified into Law Number 15 of 2003, which retroactively punishes the perpetrators behind the Bali Bombing I incident. This shows that Indonesia did not have any legal regulations to address terrorism. Although the Emergency Law number 15 of 1951 mentions actions related to explosions, it does not categorize such actions as terrorism, thus it cannot be used as a legal basis in responding to the terrorist attack during the Bali Bombing I incident at that time. This condition indicates instability in decision-making, including an inefficient mechanism in managing the existing situation due to the unpredictable and emergency nature of the event.

In responding to emergency conditions like a terrorist attack, it is important to understand that the handling can include the formation of a series of plans and procedures to

reduce the potential dangers that may occur during an attack and to enhance the effectiveness of the resources tasked with handling the critical situation (Boyd & Sullivan, 2000). Reflecting on the responses to the handling of terrorist attacks in Indonesia and the United States, there are several factors that serve as benchmarks for the differences that cause the response to terrorism in the United States to be far superior, namely the existence of a process for the rapid and precise establishment of a special agency, legal basis and having an efficient network with various other institutions in the process of handling terrorism. In addition, there is also a massive, public, invasive, and punitive movement against crimes involving crimes against humanity, especially terrorism itself through the Global War on Terror (GWOT) movement promoted by the United States. Furthermore, the United States significantly prioritizes anticipating potential attacks where, when any movement occurs, preventive actions will be taken by the government. All of this makes the United States more prepared and capable of facing terrorist attacks in the future.

Reflecting on the experience of the United States in responding to terrorism, Indonesia should make that country's response a reference in responding to terrorist attacks occurring in Indonesia. One way to do this is to implement decision-making that prioritizes rationality, which seeks to combine the best scientific evidence provided by expert opinions and modeling studies while still considering alternative actions and their impacts (Berger et al., 2021). This certainly involves many parties in decision-making, such as ministries and related institutions in responding to terrorist attacks so that the country's conditions gradually return to normal effectively and efficiently through effective handling mechanisms. However, in reality, Indonesia experienced significant chaos at that time, making it unable to carry out effective coordination, and the legal basis that was produced could only be formed shortly after the Bali Bombing I incident.

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