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Relationship between evil and thinking activities

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Abstract. Hannah Arendt argued that evil is all too frequently the product of normal citizens following the principles and prescriptions of a morally corrupt government. However, is it acceptable to blame the public organizing structure of the state or the bureaucracy as the source of rampant corruption? Through a documentary analysis based on the systematic examination and review of key sources published in various sources, it may conclude that corruption is a form of banal crime after Arendt's line of thought about the banality of crime, since the individuals involved are unable to think objectively and judge in a reflective and representative way. They blindly follow the orders of superiors and the old corrupt laws or the method of work.

Keywords. Crime, Evil, Corruption, Philosophy and Government

Introduction

Hannah Arendt famously argued in *Eichman in Jerusalem: a Report on the Banality of Evil* that evil is all too often the result of normal people accepting the values and prescriptions of a morally bankrupt regime. When she made it in 1963, it was a convincing tale about the roots of evil. Traditional understandings of corruption, generally for personal gain, have concentrated on bad people doing bad things (Lorenz et al., 2019).

Corruption, the use of public office for personal benefit, represents the evils not only of individual individuals but also of groups or organizations, whether private or public. The riskiest is precisely the latter since it includes multiple individuals from different levels and is connected to the organizational structure. Corruption is structural in nature here because it has become an intrinsic part of something ingrained in the structure of public service organizations, such that individuals participating in the corrupt system are no longer conscious that an act of corruption is what they are doing. It is therefore not shocking that when they join the bureaucracy or enter the world of practical politics, either as members of the council or other public officials, many people who are decent, trustworthy, and respectful, have honesty, and are devout in religion fall into criminal acts of corruption. A corrupt system conditions individuals to engage in acts of corruption (Liu, 2016).

Is it appropriate, however, to blame the state's public organization system or the bureaucracy as the cause of rampant corruption? Or is it reasonable to say that corruption is not a concern because it is an integral part of the laws and institutions regulating the national and

international community, and all of us will become used to it? It may be too simplistic to blame the system since the system is a human invention and can be modified at any time if the people inside have the goodwill to coordinate public institutions in a good and safe direction. Therefore, those responsible for the spread of corruption are people who are in the system- especially politicians and public officials- because of their inability to think objectively and representatively when confronted with a system that is not conducive and because of widespread fear of judgment. Because of their inability to reason and fear to judge like this, it is as if the machine that is the invention of human beings themselves enslaves politicians and elected officials. In this sense, the corrupters are nothing but "thoughtless" individuals and, at the same time, have a mechanical character because they do not know what is being done and merely obey current patterns of work.

What should be done, then, to reduce or eliminate the corruption that is systemic like that already? A more relevant problem is what kind of personal model will deter crime when most public organizations implicitly support it?

Methodology

This is a documentary study focused on systematic review and examination published primary sources contained in different collections, libraries, and record centres on Hannah Arendt. Bibliography explores these sources and archival collections.

The author therefore offers a synthesis of the findings of the study of the discussion of this subject in the conclusions.

Result and discussion

The definition of 'banality of evil' refers to the phenomenon created by totalitarian society, in which the ordinary bureaucratic apparatus optimally conducts an extraordinary crime; it implies the discrepancy between the vast dimensions of the crime and the criminal's peculiar persona. This questioned a long tradition in theology, philosophy, morality, and law, ranging from Augustine to Kant, which held that evil actions must simply be a manifestation of evil intentions and that the degree of evil displayed in crimes must be consistent with the extent of the malice of the motives (Butler, 2011).

Eichmann in Jerusalem

In her study of Adolf Eichmann, a key figure in the process of deporting Jews from German cities and neighboring countries to the Auschwitz concentration camp during World War II, Hannah Arendt introduced the term banality of evil. When seeing Eichmann himself during the trial in Jerusalem, Arendt saw that he was not "an inner Schweinehund, a filthy brute." On the contrary, he was a citizen of the law, and had no hate of the Jewish people. There appeared on his face no fanatical and cruel feelings (Marrus, 2012). He is an ordinary individual who can make claims that are normative. In front of the judges, for instance, Eichmann frequently said that he felt he had done nothing wrong, according to the internal structure of the Nazi party that was in power at the time. What he is accused of is not a crime, but 'state actions,' over which no other state (*par in parem imperium non habet*) has authority that it was his duty to comply. "(Butler, 2011)

Eichmann's obedience, according to Arendt, was a virtue that was abused by the Nazi leaders. In testimony either in court or before the police, he repeatedly confirmed his obedience to party orders and that his involvement was only for the good and the development of the German state. He acknowledged that what he did was simply party power. There is no hope and no personal choice. But this is precisely where the fault lies. Blind or uncritical obedience was

the source of his guilt and` therefore he was actually a victim. Arendt wrote: “His guilt came from his obedience, and obedience is praised as a virtue. His virtue has been abused by the Nazi leaders. But he was not one of the ruling clique, he was a victim, and only the leaders deserved punishment.” (J. & Arendt, 1965)

In connection with this Arendt then looks at what Eichmann did in a broader context, namely the totalitarianism system applied in Germany at that time, as appeared in the core of Eichmann's own defense. His defense centered on the claim that he, like many others, was only the "cog" in Hitler's bureaucratic system. It is understandable if we look at a political system - how it functions and the relationships between the various branches of government - it is quite possible to say that everything in the system functions as a cog for maintaining the continuity of government. Arendt saw that every wheel, every person, including Eichmann, must be sacrificed without changing the system, an assumption that is valid in almost all bureaucracy and countries in the world (Butler, 2011).

However, is it by considering Eichmann from this perspective that he is released from his personal responsibility for crimes against humanity? Is it true that Arendt, as many Jewish observers at the time alleged, defended Eichmann as innocent or innocent? The answer is absolutely no. Arendt considers that he remains guilty, but that his fault lies not in his motives or evil character, but in his inability or failure to think critically and independently. From Arendt's perspective as emphasized by Monica Mueller, there are two ways in which failure to think can intervene and lead human action to crime (Lorenz et al., 2019).

First, failure to test or examine reasons. Eichmann failed to ask himself why he should be involved and why the Jews were deported to Auschwitz? Failure like this leads to a sinister deal against humanity. Second, there is an obsession with certain theories or ideas that blind people to the surrounding reality. An idea or theory in itself can abstract too far from reality and therefore make itself hegemonic and ideological. Actions that result from a thinking model that is too attached to an idea or theory like this have the possibility to be corrupt and unfair. Compare it with Eichmann who acted because of the ideals obtained from others without any effort to understand them. For example, he was involved in the mass murder of Jews because of the ideal of being the ruler of everything (omnipotent) as taught by force by Hitler and his assistants.

Eichmann is an example of a person deprived of individuality as a free and capable thinking person. Even if he appeared to be a normal person, either during the Holocaust or at the Jerusalem trial, the fact is that he did not have the ability to think or understand. He is an ordinary human being, but his critical thinking disability has made him a terrifying criminal (Marrus, 2012). Apart from his inability to think critically, Eichmann is also considered to have no imagination, an ability to reflect and reflect on actions, and to imagine the consequences of certain actions. The lack of imagination led to Eichmann's failure to assess the consequences of his actions or imagine the negative consequences that might be experienced by others due to his own actions. He becomes a “hollow” person because he does not know what he is doing and is therefore unable to anticipate the negative consequences his actions have on others. In this context, the criminal is a “hollow” man, ‘emptied of whatever it is that distinguishes human beings as human’ and the consequences of a hollow man's act is called banality, the sheer mechanical thoughtlessness” (Butler, 2011).

Because it is for Eichmann, if only if he thinks critically and judges his actions from the perspective of the victims, the millions of Jews who were sent to the site of the massacre, then he must have acted otherwise. He will refuse to participate in the country's inhuman policies. The inability to think and failure to judge has blinded Eichmann's conscience to reflect honestly and admit his own mistakes. As a result, he did not think that what he had done was a crime

against humanity, but instead was something normal, normal, and ordinary. No more guilt in him. Even if he considered himself guilty, it was nothing more than self-defense that he was one of the vital “cogs” to support the functioning of a well-constructed Nazi system that demanded total obedience. An innocent and innocent appearance, a facial expression that shows no remorse, cliché answers to find peace with the victim are indications of normalcy or the reasonableness of the action. He considered his involvement in orchestrating mass killings as imperative and unavoidable. From here comes the phrase banality of crime, which, from Arendt's perspective, is understood as a situation where crime is no longer perceived as wrong, but instead as something that is mediocre or normal.

Hannah Arendt on Corruption as Banal Evil

Corruption as a Banal Crime Corruption has become a very complex and complex political issue because it is interrelated with various other issues. At the global level, for example, corruption is related to capitalism, an economic system that emphasizes investment and accumulation of capital or wealth. In the capitalist system, there is competition between individuals, especially capitalists in order to get the maximum economic benefit. Consequently, in order to live in a capitalist community, one has to adopt the ‘me first, even though I have to get rid of everyone else; mindset. This is a selfish mindset that has infiltrated modern human actions and at the same time encourages corrupt behavior. Therefore it is true what N. Vittal, a former head of the supervisory commission in India, said that one of the main causes of corruption is the addiction to a consumerist ethos or slavery to gratification and material success (Liu, 2016).

Apart from capitalism, corruption is also closely related to the dynastic political system, which is the 'biological child' of what Arendt calls the phenomenon of the colonialization of public space by private space or the expansion of private space to cover the public space as well. Such colonialization or expansion was due to the emergence of the social sphere, as a separate or autonomous sphere, a separation not found in ancient Greek thought (Arendt, 2013). The emergence of the social sphere and the loss of distinction between the private and public spheres resulted in what should have existed in private space made public or gained public significance. Alternatively, the family category expands into the public sphere, where private and limited issues within the family receive public value. From here comes the phenomenon of dynastic politics, a form of monopoly on political power and ownership of public office by politicians based on family relations. The main reason for the emergence of dynastic politics is the ability of politicians to create an ‘uneven playing field' by exploiting family networks and material wealth to help family members gain public office (Cane, 2015).

One simple and unavoidable argument, apart from the pros and cons of the advent of this political dynasty, is that dynastic politics is fundamentally opposed to politics, which was understood as any practice since ancient Greece that is closely connected to the state or public interest because it is the basis for personal and family group interests (Cane, 2015).

As Arendt emphasized above, people who do not think are not stupid because people can be very smart or intelligent but because of the temptation to indulge in routine tasks and mechanistic behavior, they are unable to think critically and independently and assess things comprehensively. One of the reasons that corruptors often use to defend themselves is that what they make is part of the system and they only follow or carry out orders from their superiors (Morgan, 2016). So, people who are unable to think are people who do not use their critical abilities to test or examine the reasons behind his actions. For example, a department head simply signs a project proposal without reading, correcting and carefully questioning the proposal, or an office treasurer executes a memo from his superior to issue money without

questioning the reason and purpose for spending the money. In addition, people who are unable to think are people who have poor imagination so that they cannot imagine the feelings of poor people who desperately need money to survive.

Hannah Arendt on Thinking Activities

In order to understand thinking as an alternative in an effort to reduce or even completely eradicate corruption, we must look at what thinking itself means. Arendt himself framed his research as stated in the book *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, as an effort to understand (comprehension), which is understood as “unpremeditated, attentive facing up to, and resisting of, reality - whatever it may be” (Gordon, 2018a). She explained that her project was compiling *The Human Condition*, as a ‘problem of thought’ as opposed to the inability to think as is. According to her, thinking is the safest network against crimes that threaten the modern world, as is corruption that is rampant in almost all over the world today.

What is thinking in Arendt's perspective? Arendt distinguishes thinking from rationalization. According to him, rationalization is seductive because in the process people try to find as many answers as possible to justify their own behavior, actions and beliefs. In rationalization, reason is used as a tool or instrument for the sake of self-justification and action. This is what is called instrumental rationality. Ordinary people rationalize to justify what should not be unthinkable. For example, the Nazis justified their evil actions by arguing that they were only following orders from above. The same is the case with terrorists who argue that their acts of violence are in accordance with the orders of their religion or ideology. In this context, reason risks putting people in 'the iron band of terror' (Bernstein, 2011). Besides being seductive, rationalization is also secretive. Arendt calls it “ice-cold reasoning” because it is done in loneliness where people depend only on themselves and have no relationship with other people. In this context, reason is used as an ‘inner coercion’ for self-righteousness or self-confirmation. Thus, reason puts people in “the iron band of terror” (Gordon, 2018b).

In contrast to rationalization, the main requirement for thinking activities is solitude, which is distinguished from loneliness. The person who is in silence is one who is with himself; whereas a lonely person is a person who, even in the company of other people, has lost the experience of being with other people. For Arendt, only in a state of silence do people actualize their thinking abilities. Thinking is done in silence when people dialogue or talk to themselves. Even so, this dialogue does not lose touch with the world of fellow human beings because they are presented in the dialogue with us (Vázquez, 2006). Fellow humans are the alter-egos with which we communicate or have dialogue. So, thinking activities that always take into account the reality around us — especially intentional beings — are called dialogical thinking models.

There are several important points emphasized by Arendt in his description of thinking activities, which are very crucial in the effort to eradicate corruption crimes. Among them are: thinking as a dialogue or talking to oneself; thinking activities that are always tied to the reality of the human world so that thoughts are representative; and lastly, thinking enables people to distance themselves from corruptors and corrupt systems (Morgan, 2016).

Hannah Arendt on Knowing Oneself

Like other thinkers, Arendt also defines thinking as dialogue or talking to oneself. To explain this definition he turns to the figure of Socrates who in Plato's dialogues is shown as a person who knows himself before engaging in dialogue with others. That means that knowing oneself is the main prerequisite before one knows to live with others (Morgan, 2016). Knowing oneself is only possible when people dialogue with oneself, as Socrates did. In silence, Socrates is not alone but with himself because he is in a fixed 'two-in-one' dialogue situation. In dialogue

with himself in silence, Socrates presents himself as a unique person in the midst of human plurality.

Only the self-talker will worry that in acting unethically, he will live with a criminal. Socrates was accustomed to thinking with his own other, *daimon*, prompting him to claim: "It is better for me that many people disagree with me and oppose me than, against myself." Arendt repeatedly quotes this and asserts that an individual person, even if one is one, can contradict himself. If I conflict with others, I can leave them. However, I cannot leave myself alone, unless I stop dialogue with myself. Because thinking activity means that I have to live with myself — with my other self (*daimon*) —thinking is an activity that can prevent people from committing crimes (Vázquez, 2006).

Starting from the understanding of thinking activities as talking to oneself, Arendt then emphasized that a moral proposition should take its standard from people's encounter with oneself in the dialogue. What is meant here is that moral standards should be withdrawn from the self, a worldly being who appears and thinks. Consequently, Arendt's ethics is not legalistic, as found in Kant's categorical imperative: "Act in such a way that the maxims of your actions become a general law for all intelligent beings." According to Arendt, the above proposition can be seen as a categorical 'statement' and not just a categorical 'imperative', which implies sanctions from without either from God or from the community. Because, by treating the proposition as a categorical statement, the sanctions come from within ourselves. This is what is called self-punishment, which Kant calls 'self-contempt' and Socrates calls it 'self-contradiction'. Punishing yourself is only possible for people who live and dialogue with themselves regularly. Self-talkers will discover in themselves what is good and bad and punish themselves for their own mistakes. This argument is weak and less convincing because it ignores the importance of external sanctions, but Arendt's position should be understood in the context of his emphasis on the importance of being critical in the face of tradition, law or external obligations. He challenges us to make external sanctions our own sanctions because each sanction becomes our own categorical statement. If we think about a problem, for example, about corruption, seriously, especially think and judge from the perspective of victims, small and simple people who really need money to fulfill their basic needs, then we will feel the suffering of so many people. As a result, guilt arises in us; and if there is guilt it means we also share in feeling the 'pain' from within as a result of that guilt (Gordon, 2018b).

It is precisely the guilt and pain when thinking about acts of corruption that prevent people from doing the same. In other words, the feeling of pain due to guilt helps us to eliminate morally wrong choices for action (Kang, 2013). In this context, guilt functions as an "interrupt mechanism" or internal sanction, which prevents and stops corrupt behavior

Hannah Arendt on Representative Thinking

Another point that emerges from Arendt's description of thinking is the fact that although dialogue with oneself is carried out in silence when one is with oneself, this dialogue does not lose touch with the reality of the world. Arendt compared this thought activity to the audience of a drama. The audience contemplates or thinks of the game as an outsider. They do not take part in the game. They simply withdrew but did not leave the theater or games. With that, they can see, judge and understand the game as a whole. Likewise with thinking activities. Thinking as a solitary activity must always be related to the plurality of humans who are also thinking creatures. In order to think one has to withdraw from daily activities or routines. However, he only took distance instead of abandoning his daily activities because by taking a distance one could comprehensively assess and understand something.

This kind of thinking activity does not require pillars, standards or traditions, but only seeing the reality around us. Therefore, the starting point for thinking activities is the reality around us. In other words, thinking is an activity that always takes into account the reality around us. Here, Arendt admires Karl Jaspers, who, although living apart, free and alone in the dark ages due to Hitler's horror still thinks in silence about public matters relating to humanity as a whole. In this way, Jaspers represents philosophers who make the mind their world or home, but their thinking, even though it is partial, remains tied to the world and the other people in it (Morgan, 2016).

Thinking models that always consider the surrounding reality, especially fellow humans, indicate a belief in the ability of others to think and judge and respect or respect a plurality of perspectives. In an interview with Gunther Gaus, Arendt claims that his thinking is always based on 'trust in people', an attitude of trust, something that is difficult to formulate but very fundamental, about what is human in all human beings (Arendt, 2013). "This belief indicates that all human beings have general abilities, and therefore can judge from different positions in the world. In this context, Arendt adopts Kant's idea of 'enlarged mentality', which he calls "the train of one's imagination to go visiting" or 'representative thinking', which means forming an opinion by considering existing issues from different perspectives or by bringing into our own minds the viewpoints of others. Here, impartiality is the main requirement so that people are able to assess in a representative manner, taking into account other people's judgments as well. Therefore, when people think, he broadens his mentality to be able to consider or include other people's perspectives in his thinking. This is what is called representative thinking, which is characteristic of political thought (Morgan, 2016).

Political thinking is representative. People form an opinion by considering a given issue from a different point of view, by presenting to their mind the perspective of the absent person, that represent them. The more points of view of the person they present in their mind as they ponder the given issue, and the better they imagine how they would feel and think if they were in their place, the stronger will their will be to their ability for representative thinking and the more valid their conclusions will be. Representative thinking is not the same as theoretical contemplation because the object is the real world, the world that is shared, the world as a network of relations between people. This model of thinking is concerned with the alternative perspectives that a person develops in dialogue with others and is drawn from experiences (Bernstein, 2011).

Many public officials and legislators are involved in corruption crimes because they do not have the imagination to imagine what if they were in the position of the person being served or represented. In addition, they are also not critical of seeing the condition of the state and society as a whole. If the corruptors consider their actions from the perspective of victims, people in rural areas who have difficulty gaining access to the city because of poor road transportation, clean water, electricity, and various other necessities, they will certainly act the opposite. Even if they do not act otherwise, at least they feel guilty, tortured, and will always be in a dilemma.

Therefore, Arendt's emphasis on representative thinking is very important in efforts to prevent these acts of corruption. A person who thinks will always make decisions based on an enlarged mentality that includes perspective and considers the fate of many people. Alternatively, thinking public officials or legislators will always imagine the distress and suffering, concerns and anxieties and struggles for survival of the people they serve or the constituencies who have elected them. Thus, they will be able to evaluate themselves so that they are not trapped in the banality of corruption crimes.

Faced with the spread of the fear of judging phenomenon, Arendt emphasized the importance of reflective judgment, a model of assessment that starts from particular events rather than universal and absolute standards. Arendt's emphasis that reflective judgment starts from particular events that occur in the world and not from universal standards can be applied to morality. In fact, he claims that the absolute standard of morality has collapsed in the tragedy of the Holocaust (Morgan, 2016). This collapse gives the impression that what we call morality contains merely "habits" and is nothing more than a set of habits, behavior that can be changed with other groups. This set of habits tends to be uncritically accepted because people never doubt what they have been taught. What is concerning Arendt is the uncritical thinking that exists in humans because of the tendency to accept the moral standards that are given to them. For him, following moral standards has the possibility of shutting down thought processes. This can be seen in Adolf Eichmann, who is described by Arendt as incapable of thinking because in court he always repeats the same phrases in order to find peace with his enemies (Marrus, 2012).

People in the bureaucracy, for example, are involved in corruption, because of their inability to: distance themselves from systemic matters, to differentiate themselves from others, to bear negative consequences such as displacement or not given a job because of their critical thinking. Eichmann also uncritically followed Hitler's orders for one of the reasons for not wanting to lose his position in the bureaucracy. Therefore, it is clear that only by thinking critically and judging reflectively will people "stand out" and become reformers of a corrupt system.

In addition, people who are able to judge reflectively are also required, in the sense of judging something from or by considering other people's perspectives. Such people will be able to avoid simplification, compromise and convention. Arendt asserts, "When everyone is carried away unthinkingly by what everyone else is doing or believing, the thinking person is pulled out of hiding because of their refusal to join the evil deal and thus becomes a model of action. The thinker is a person who stands as a beacon or a tower of fire not for some particular ideology or policy, but to follow one's conscience" (Vázquez, 2006).

Conclusion

Following Arendt's line of thinking about the banality of crime, we can say that corruption is a form of banal crime because the people involved are not able to think critically and judge in a reflective and representative way. They obey blindly to orders from superiors and to the old corrupt rules or work system. Indeed, encouraging people to follow rules or norms is a great place to start cultivating an ethical sensibility. However, following the rules is not sufficient to form a virtuous person because one can follow the rules easily but act very unkindly. Alternatively, obeying the rules can lead to confusion. Therefore, to reduce and even eradicate corruption, an educational model is needed that emphasizes critical and reflective thinking and acts and understands various social problems. People who think critically and are representative are people who are able to distance themselves from bad people or corruptors, from unhealthy systems and from any events that are experienced and contrary to their conscience, as well as people who are able to put themselves in the position of others who are served or represented.

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