

Technium.

43/2023

2023
A new decade for social changes

Technium
Social Sciences



The Institutional Dynamics of Sub-District in Indonesia

Sad Dian Utomo¹, Irfan Ridwan Maksum², Teguh Kurniawan³

^{1,2,3}Faculty of Administrative Science, Department of Public Administration,
University of Indonesia, Depok, West Java

saddian01@gmail.com, irm60@ui.ac.id, teguh.kurniawan@ui.ac.id

Abstract. This article examines what factors lead to the institutional dynamics of sub-district in Indonesia. Institutional dynamics are changes due to interaction patterns, values, culture, and people's tastes. In this study, we look at the institutional dynamics of sub-district from two primary causal factors: endogenous and exogenous. The findings conclude that endogenous factors consist of the sub-district human resources, budget, and creativity/innovation of the sub-district head. In comparison, exogenous factors consist of national policies related to sub-districts; the role of the sub-district supervisor; regent/mayor commitment; public perception; information technology; and area characteristics (rural and urban). Based on these institutional dynamics, it is necessary to reposition sub-district institutions by developing sub-district institutional models for rural areas, urban areas, and a hybrid of both.

Keywords. sub-district, institutional dynamics, local government, decentralization, coordination, community empowerment, and governance

Introduction

For more than four decades, the Government of Indonesia has adopted a decentralization policy that has led to variations in the subdistricts' position and authority. The sub-district is Indonesia's lowest local government level, under the province and regency/city. As the world's fourth-biggest country, Indonesia has the world's largest land archipelago and witnessed tremendous economic expansion in the 1980s and 1990s, making it one of the newly industrialized nations. Indonesia is a member of the G-20 due to its rising GDP and presided over the organization in 2022. Due to the financial and political problems of 1999, Indonesia transitioned from an authoritarian and centralized nation to a decentralized democracy. This year, a period known as the Reformation Era began; the Government of Indonesia issued the Local Government Law (number 22 of 1999), which changed the entire structure and status of sub-districts, specifically as the working area of sub-district heads in the context of decentralization. Previously, the sub-district head was the central government apparatus as a part of deconcentration. The Local Government Law of 1999 was later amended by Law No. 32 of 2004 and revised by Law No. 23 of 2014, which clarifies the purpose of forming sub-districts, namely to improve government coordination, public services, and the empowerment of village and urban village communities. Sub-district heads (known as *camat*) are also

reinforced by implementing general government affairs. Since it was legally controlled in 1974, the sub-district institution has seen ups and downs due to the local government laws.

The central government could have responded better to this institutional change, and there was even uncertainty in the positioning of the sub-districts. This uncertainty can be seen from at least two indications, namely: *first*, the unclear form of the sub-district organization. The grouping of local government organizations in Indonesia is based on Mintzberg's organizational formation (1993), which consists of five elements: strategic apex, middle line, operating core, technostructure, and supporting staff. It is not clear what the position of the sub-district is. The sub-district is only mentioned as a territorial local government organization that coordinates, functions, and delivers certain simple and high-intensity services. This can lead to different interpretations, depending on whether the sub-district is the operating core because it delivers certain services, as technostructure because it assists the regent/mayor in supporting the smooth implementation of core functions, or a separate element because it is not included in one of the elements above. *Second*, the central government sets no concrete indicators of progress or measurements of sub-district performance. This differs from villages under the foster and supervision of the sub-district head (*camat*). Villages are measured for progress based on several categories evaluated by the Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Villages, Development of Disadvantaged Regions and Transmigration, and National Development Planning Agency.

This uncertainty has made sub-districts less effective, according to studies. Sub-district institutions are projected to contribute significantly to decentralization. However, according to Opare (2015), the sub-district level is closer to the community and better suited to gather community input on development policies and programs. The position of the sub-district makes it vital to decentralization success. This sub-district can solve community issues faster and better than the central government. Unfortunately, the weakness of sub-districts facilities and infrastructure and the local government's lack of assistance prevent it from reaching its potential as a grass roots development structure. Sub-districts become dependent and weak. They needed additional authority to foster community participation and bottom-up development. Hence, sub-districts must be reorganized and strengthened (Forkuor & Adjei, 2016).

Panday (2017) notes that while sub-districts are meant to increase community participation and meet local needs and aspirations, the central government still controls them by enforcing regulations and controlling their income. So, sub-districts must be more flexible in creating development plans that meet community needs and goals. The sub-district apparatus's inadequate planning and budgeting capacity, staff shortage, and central government control worsen this. This situation and the sub-districts need more authority and accountability, and the center's heavy meddling prevents them from being influential. Shanghai is an effective sub-district. The sub-district structure is necessary since the city authority cannot manage all issues. The sub-district structure allows the city government to monitor people's activities and respond to new developments and community needs. The sub-district can directly serve community people and drive community development. Shanghai's sub-district creates jobs for the unemployed, supports vulnerable populations, maintains urban cleanliness and public health, and enforces party programs, including family planning, social stability, and security (Chung, 2018).

Several problems related to the performance of the sub-district resulted in the emergence of a discourse to abolish the sub-district. Dharmawan (2008), who conducted research in 10 sub-districts and six regencies/cities in five provinces in Indonesia, questioned the nomenclature of local government institutions in Indonesia due to bureaucratic inefficiency

and the unnecessary regional development function of sub-district. The Governor of Jakarta, Indonesia, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, advocated for the urban village and the abolition of sub-district offices in Jakarta if they were no longer needed. One-Stop Service was the idea. He believes One Stop Service can only exist if the urban village head and *camat* provide excellent service to communities. The Jakarta Provincial Government could save IDR 10 trillion (about USD 667 million) by disbanding *camats* (*detiknews*, May 29, 2015).

Smith (1985) previously criticized urban regional organizational units. He believes city regions hinder efficiency in public services like hospitals and schools. City governments cannot use the city-region concept because urban areas have special needs that require integrated handling, unlike rural areas. Since local governments are more efficient in larger areas, urban area divisions are inefficient. Local government units must have a minimum size (Smith, 1985). Large-scale organizations must manage urban public services like housing, water, waste, and transportation. Larger organizations offer better career opportunities, can serve more people, and are economically viable. In the 1960s and 1980s, European countries like Denmark, West Germany, England, and Sweden amalgamated city/municipal governments to reduce their number and size. Recent research suggests expanding a city's territorial jurisdiction can lower city government costs (Blom-Hansen & Houlberg, 2014; Cobban, 2019).

Based on the description of the sub-district institutional conditions above, this paper focuses on how sub-district institutional dynamics are in Indonesian local government, why they occur, and how they affect Indonesia's sub-district institutional position. Indonesian urban and rural sub-districts are used in this study. This paper examines endogenous and exogenous causes of sub-district institutional dynamics.

Research data was collected from March 2021 to June 2022 through in-depth interviews with open-ended questions. Thirty-eight central government officials, the mayor, bureaucrats, academics, nongovernmental organization activists, and community representatives with expertise on the issues were interviewed. This study uses primary and secondary data from legal acts, archival materials, verbatim focus group notes, and media articles. The data analysis method uses a qualitative method that uses NVIVO to assist data management and analysis.

This paper is structured as follows: The second part outlines the theoretical approach by focussing on local government institutions, institutional approaches, and sub-district institutional dynamics. The third part covers Indonesian sub-district institutions from pre-Independence to the present. The fourth section discusses sub-district institution dynamics and causes that affect the repositioning of sub-district institutions. In the last section, we will end the article by discussing sub-district institutional models to reposition Indonesian sub-districts.

Local Government Institution, Institutional Approach, and Sub-District Institutional Dynamics


Sub-district in Indonesia is part of the local government unit, particularly in the regency or city. Talking local government (in this paper, abbreviated as LG) must be connected to decentralization. Smith (1985) links decentralization to the state's geographical hierarchy and the institutions and processes that distribute power. Decentralization distributes central government power to LGs for regional management. Centralization and decentralization coexist. Both are indistinguishable. No government authority is fully centralized or decentralized. Thus, state decentralization and centralization are intertwined (Turner and Hulme, 1997). According to Smith (1985), decentralization has strategic value linked to a country's political and economic goals, making it more popular in governance. Decentralization

will improve political capacity, national integration, accountability, and government-people relations. Economically, decentralization promotes faster public goods and more efficient local services. Smith's statement is supported by other experts, as elaborated by Rumbach (2016), that decentralization increases responsiveness and effectiveness of local governance (Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2006; Chattopadhyay, 2012; Faguet, 2012); improve the voice and local participation of people and civil society actors in governance (Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007); encourage local economic growth and social justice (Behar & Kumar 2002); increasing political stability by providing opportunities for minority populations to exercise control over LG and the issues that affect it (Faguet, 2014); and reducing corruption and rent-seeking behavior from politicians and political parties (Lessman & Markwardt 2010; Vernon, Williams, Corbridge, & Srivastava, 2006). For Smith to achieve this goal, power must be allocated or distributed from the center down. That's why decentralization can be interpreted as the "territorial distribution of power." Decentralization and deconcentration, which experts define differently, are the two main power distribution methods (Alderfer, 1964; Smith, 1985; Conyers, 1986). Decentralization involves power distribution and autonomous regions, according to Hoessein (2003). As a public legal entity, an autonomous region can create its own field-level service administration and delegate to other units. In a unitary state like Indonesia, this local LG is formed by the central government, which has no sovereignty.

Due to the implementation of decentralization, government institutions were formed locally to carry out the LG's tasks, functions, and authorities. Government institutions are crucial because they enable governance, development, and public services. According to Katz (1985), government institutions help meet technical development needs. Mintzberg's (1979) view on LG organizations' tasks and functions is crucial. He divided the organization's functions into five categories: strategic apex, middle line, operating core, technostructure, and supporting staff. Leaders that formulate strategic policies hold the *strategic apex* function. A person or unit that acts as a liaison between the strategic apex and the operating core and has formal authority to provide facilities to other organizational elements holds the middle-line function. Operating core functions are carried out by units or individuals in direct contact with the community. The technostructure function is not directly involved in the work process of the organization, but its work affects another organizational element because its job is to carry out the analysis, whose results are submitted to the leader to make strategic policies. Finally, like the technostructure, supporting staff work outside the work process flows to support overall organizational elements.

According to Mintzberg, LG heads are Indonesia's *strategic apex* because they create strategic policies. As the *middle line*, the LG secretary can provide facilities and liaise between LG heads and units. The Office helps LG implement strategic policies to regulate and manage government affairs delegated to them, both mandatory and optionally, as part of the *operating core*. The Agency and Inspectorate are *technostructures* that assist LG heads in regulatory and administrative tasks to support the operating core. The LG Secretariate and Local Parliament Secretariate help LG organizations run smoothly as *supporting staff*.

Organizational Task and Function Elements



Source: Mintzberg, 1979

According to Mintzberg, the sub-district is an *operating core* because it provides certain services and is a *technostructure* that helps LG heads coordinate. These two positions of sub-district were not explicitly elaborated in more technical arrangements so that each party could give a different meaning to the sub-district.

Internationally, sub-districts are often associated with sub-district administration; as Boonsiri and Phiriyasamith (2016) elaborated, one of the LG units is very small but very big in numbers and closed in public. According to Maksum (2014), the sub-district is Indonesia's original LG structure, but other countries have organizational units under LG with different names, such as Yemen and Thailand is divided into provinces, regencies/cities, sub-districts, and villages.

Decentralization within the state—particularly how power is shared between the central government and LG—has been discussed. The LG (regencies/cities) with authority to regulate and manage can delegate authority to other LG units to share the burden and make their jobs easier. According to Smith (1985), bureaucratic decentralization or deconcentration aims to reduce government burden by delegating authority to lower bureaucratic units. Rondinelli (1999) calls this administrative decentralization, which shares authority, responsibility, and financial resources to provide public services at various government levels. Using Smith's (1985) framework, the regency/city government can delegate some government affairs to the sub-district, but the sub-district cannot regulate or make policies. Administrative decentralization allows smaller units to manage services closer to the community. According to Norton (1994), cited by Muluk (2009), LGs can decentralize within cities to smaller government units to bring responsibility and decision-making closer to the community. Norton (1994) states that global community participation in LG includes *economic, functional, administrative, and political decentralization within cities*. Economic decentralization involves LG-owned enterprises or the privatization of LG functions. Functional decentralization creates functional agencies to manage LG affairs. Administrative decentralization involves sub-district to meet community needs more efficiently than being carried out directly by the regency/city government. Finally, LGs delegate some matters and funds to village governments, which is political decentralization since village government heads are elected to preserve traditional values and keep democratization and citizen participation. The elected village government head can then appoint village government staff. These four forms represent *decentralization within cities* in Indonesian LG.

Indonesian governance is decentralized and deconcentrated. Smith (1985) calls deconcentration a bureaucratic and administrative decentralization. Bureaucratic decentralization allows lower bureaucratic units to exercise authority and reduce government burden (Nurcholis, 2005). Bureaucratic decentralization with sub-districts reduces regency/city government tasks. Regency/city government can make policies, but sub-districts can only carry out some government affairs. Administrative decentralization involves giving smaller units administrative power to bring services closer to the community with administrative authority.

Regarding LG institutions, according to Uphoff (1986), the concept of institutions is often used interchangeably with the organization because they are considered related to objects that have many similarities or are even considered the same. Institutions include regulations, mechanisms, and organizations, according to the World Development Report 2002. Other experts distinguish institutions from organizations. Organizations differ from institutions, according to North (1990). He compared institutions to game rules, where the place to play is the organization.

Institutions are important because Etzioni (1985) believes they reveal a society's lifestyle. People behave like their social organization. Bellah, cited by Neo & Chen (2007), defines institutions as social activities that shape collective and individual experiences, like Etzioni. Cheema (1980) defines institutions in six dimensions: authority and status; access; bureaucratic and organizational structure; leadership; technical competence; and information and communication. Another expert, Ruttan, and Hayami (1984), define institutions as rules within an organization or group that help members achieve their goals. Saleth and Dinar (2004) then explore the institution through three elements: 1) law, which is the legality of a policy or administrative activity and regulation; 2) policy, which is related to priority setting, decentralization or centralization, and technology; and 3) administration, which discusses the level of government, administrative structure, finance, accountability, information capability, and technical caliber. Scott (2008) defines institutions as everything that guides, resources and hinders actors, including norms, regulations, and cultural knowledge.

According to experts, there are two perspectives on institutions and organizations. Organizations are the same as institutions, but institutions are broader. This study proposes that institutions are broader than organizations. The theory of the institution can be divided into three major groups: Old Institutionalism, New Institutionalism, and Neo-Institutionalism. The Old Institutionalism theory is attributed to several experts, four of whom are Robert Merton (1936, 1940), Philip Selznick (1948), Arthur Stinchcombe (1968), and Talcott Parsons (1956). Merton studied bureaucracy and its effects. His classic essay, "Bureaucratic Structure and Personality," investigated how organization officials follow the rules or norms. He concluded that bureaucratic organizations and their systems influence the personality of their employees and create change-resistant bureaucrats. Selznick, Merton's student, continued his research. "The most significant thing" about organizations, Selznick (1949) wrote in his renowned study of the Tennessee Valley Authority, is that "while they are instruments, each yet has a life of its own." Organizations function as organic systems and are affected by external stimuli. Hence, circumstance constrains and influences social action (Scott, 2001).

The next development was the New Institutionalism theory. This theory rejects the rational-actor model, an independent variable explaining cognition and culture in Old Institutionalism. New Institutionalism is closely related to public organization and administration literature. New Institutionalism economists believe that institutions, including governments, only exist if their benefits outweigh their costs (Farashahi, Hafsi, and Molz, 2005; Williamson, 1985). Political scientists view institutions as rules that govern behavior (Ostrom,

1986). Sociologists and organizational theorists in public administration reject the rational actor model of economists and political scientists in favor of explanations involving cultural and cognitive elements of institutions (Farashahi and Molz, 2005). Organizations can be institutional or part of larger institutions, according to Selznick (1949). The New Institutionalism provides more insights into organizational external dynamics than the Old Institutionalism, which focuses on internal dynamics. New Institutionalism emphasizes that institutional context shapes and limits organizational behavior. New Institutionalism emphasizes external influences on institutions.

In their development, these two theories (Old-Institutionalism and New Institutionalism) must be considered inadequate in comprehensively understanding institutional dynamics. According to March and Olson (1984), the Old-Institutionalism perspective with a focus only on internal factors has several limitations, including being less able to distinguish government from society; viewing political phenomena as the overall consequences of individual behavior; seeing action as a product of self-interest; seeing history as an efficient mechanism for achieving the right balance, but being less concerned with adaptability. Other scholars argue that New-Institutionalism focuses on external factors and environments and fails to analyze the internal dynamics of institutional change, thus failing to explain why some organizations succeed in adopting radical changes while others fail despite facing the same institutional factors (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996).

Neo-Institutionalism theories, which came after New-Institutionalism, say that internal and external factors or forces are just as important when looking at institutional change or dynamics. This means that parts of both Old-Institutionalism and New-Institutionalism are useful for institutional analysis (Chisholm 1985; Greenwood and Hinings 1996; Hoffman 2001). Selznick (1996), whose early work is associated with Old Institutionalism, argued that institutional forms and processes should be understood as responses to internal and external environments. The reasoning is that only considering internal or external forces of institutions simplifies institutional change and resistance to change. Thus, focusing on one or the other means not understanding institutions fully. According to Oliver (1992), internal and external forces affect institutional change, so both must be considered to understand institutional reality fully. Thus, Neo-Institutionalism theory proposes bridging Old- and New-Institutionalism to understand organizational responses better

As mentioned earlier, Scott (2008) sees institutions as rules maintaining social order. Institutions change with the social, economic, and political environment and provide stability. Interaction patterns, values, culture, and public tastes change institutional dynamics. González (2016) studied institutional dynamics in decentralization. González says institutional dynamics depend on how much national and sub-national (regional) actors interact, whether they support or oppose decentralization. Institutional dynamics depend on institutions, actors, and external factors like economic cycles (Benton 2009; Braun and Trein 2014). Institutionalization processes change external parties' expectations.

According to Ostrom (2007), institutional change can occur at several levels, namely: 1) operational rule, which is a change in the rules that govern how community members interact; 2) collective choice rule, which changes how operational rules are made or changed, who makes them, and when they must be made; and 3) constitutional rule, which changes who can work at the collective choice level and how. Ostrom (2008) states that technological change and resource depletion cause institutional change. Neo-Institutionalism, which considers internal and external factors equally important in institutional change, agrees with Ostrom. The institutional change appears to be driven by exogenous and endogenous factors. Koning (2016)

outlined experts' opinions on the causes and mechanisms of institutional change: *first*, exogenous factors, which include critical junctures, such as the issuance of Indonesia's decentralization policies through Local Government Law No. 22 of 1999, which drastically changed the position and authority of the sub-district head (*camat*); incremental changes, which can be seen from several policy changes that do not provide significant changes; distribution of authority; and changes in norms. *Second*, endogenous factors), include positive and negative feedback about the institution, a weakening or exhaustion of current conditions that don't seem to change as expected, and learning processes happening within the organization.

As referred to by Ostrom and Koning, institutional change is interpreted as institutional dynamics in this study. These institutional dynamics are then analyzed using the Neo-Institutionalism theory. Neo-Institutionalism is used because it is more comprehensive than Old-Institutionalism, which cannot explain the forces that force institutions to change, or New-Institutionalism, which needs to consider the sociocultural context in which the institution is located.

This study's conceptual framework states that exogenous factors like technology and endogenous factors like resources affect sub-district institutions. Urban or rural areas of sub-districts also are exogenous factors. The dynamics of the sub-district institution are caused by two issues: the factual problem of the sub-district, which is related to the unclear form of the sub-district organization in the grouping of LG organizational elements; the lack of concrete indicators of progress or performance that are determined nationally; and the lack of regent/mayor support or agency obstacles to implementing the sub-district authority; an organizational structure that is relatively unchanged even though the paradigm of LG administration has changed; the limited number and competence of human resources apparatus; budget limitations; service performance that is not yet optimal, obstacles in carrying out the task of fostering and supervising village governments, and relatively unchanged community perceptions, even though the position, responsibilities, and authority of the *camat* have changed. Another problem is conceptual, namely regarding the theoretical position of the sub-district, especially when viewed from the organizational form stated by Mintzberg and its position as a city-region, as stated by Smith (1985) and Sharpe (1978).

Method

We used a multi-method study based on in-depth interviews, focus group discussions, and primary and secondary data. In-depth interviews allowed us to ask questions to thirty-eight respondents consisting of government officials in central, LGs, and village agencies; practitioners and academics who were selected based on their competence and capacity; and community members living in the sub-districts that were the research locations to ensure the quality and validity of the research data. The selection of informants was based on their having adequate knowledge related to decentralization and LG policies, including sub-districts and public services, and having experience interacting with sub-districts in the research locations. Interviews were conducted from March 2021 to June 2022. The purpose of in-depth interviews was to identify and map various problems and important issues related to the policy, position, authority, and institutional aspects of sub-districts in LG. Interviews are also a confirmation or rechecking tool for information from literature studies. In this research, the interview technique used was an in-depth interview guide with open-ended questions. This research also used the focus group discussion (FGD), which was conducted four times: on September 14, 2021; September 30, 2021; October 19, 2021; and November 15, 2021, involving central government officials, LG officials, sub-district heads, academics, NGO activists, and practitioners. The

FGDs also served as a triangulation effort to confirm the results of the in-depth interviews, most of which had been conducted before the first FGD (September 14, 2021). Using these tools, we found various problems related to sub-districts, the dynamics of sub-district institutions, and the impact of changes in LG policies on sub-districts, and proposed recommendations for restructuring sub-district institutions.

Evolution of Sub-district Institutional Policies

Since the Indonesia ancient kingdoms, sub-district-level officials coordinated village heads. During the Dutch and Japanese colonial periods, the sub-district head (*camat*) was the lowest-ranking government organization collecting tribute, mobilizing labor for the colonizers, controlling village heads, socializing colonial policies, and spreading propaganda with no autonomy.


After Indonesia's independence and under President Soekarno (1945–1965), known as the “Old Order” period, sub-districts were abolished as centralization devices because LGs were only autonomous. However, Nurcholis (2016) claims that the sub-district remains a centralization device coordinating sub-district agencies and controlled villages. The Law on the Principles of Local Government of 1957 categorizes Indonesia's autonomous regions as Level I (province), Level II (regency/city), and Level III. These unspecified Level III regions consist of small towns and villages. Since sub-districts are larger than villages, this may facilitate their autonomy. The Law on the Principles of Local Government of 1965 replaced the Law of 1957, which specified that provinces, regencies/cities, and subdistricts were Level I, Level II, and Level III regions, respectively. The Old Order sub-district also was marked by competition between *camat* and LG office/agency heads to establish technical units at the sub-district-level to reduce the *camat*'s influence (Nordholt, 1987; Nasdian, 2008).

During President Soeharto's New Order (1967–1998), the Law on Principles of Governance at the Local Level of 1974 and the Law on Village Government of 1979 modified sub-district institutions' norms and ideals. Both laws reference centralized government. The *camat* sets sub-district agency standards, values, and organization. The Law of 1974 states that the *camat* heads the sub-district area. This makes the *camat* almost as powerful as the governor and regent/mayor in coordinating government agencies in the sub-district, both as a government apparatus and as a patron of the community. Both laws refocused the village's role as an “agent of the sub-district,” with the sub-district acting as an extension of the central government to create policing tasks, implement general government affairs, coordinate government units in the sub-district area, and foster and supervise villages.

In 1999, the Reform Movement and issuing the Local Government Law of 1999 decentralized government. The shift from centralized to decentralized government affected the sub-district and the *camat* positions. The sub-district became an LG unit, and the *camat* was “stripped” of power unless the regent/mayor gave it authority based on delegation of authority. Central governments no longer control the *camat* and sub-district.

Five years later, the Local Government Law No. 32 of 2004 amended this by requiring the *camat* to organize general government affairs and regional autonomy affairs. Government Regulation (abbreviated as GR) No. 19/2008 on Sub-Districts detailed the *camat*'s tasks in organizing general government affairs stated in laws and received a delegation of authority from the regent/mayor. In 2014, the Government of Indonesia changed the policy again by issuing the Local Government Law No. 23 of 2014 to replace Law No. 32 of 2004, confirming that the sub-district is part of the regency/city led by the *camat*. The latest law grants the sub-district significant authority. Restoring the *camat*'s position similar to as head of the sub-district area,

as Law of 1974, the *camat* would carry out the general government affairs in the sub-district area and other attributional tasks like fostering and supervising villages. The GR No. 17/2018 on Sub-districts that replace GR No. 19/2008 elaborates on the position of the sub-district and the *camat's* tasks, including attributive and delegated tasks and implementing general government affairs. The *camat* also received tasks to foster and supervise villages, including facilitating inter-village cooperation, village planning, village financial management, asset utilization, and technical assistance to the village government. The following figure shows the evolution of the sub-district institution policies.



(a) Source: processed by the researcher, 2022.

Discussion

Since the issuance of Law No. 5 of 1974 concerning the Principles of Government in the Regions until Local Government Law No. 23 of 2014, it appears that policy on local governments has led to sub-district institutional dynamics, as evidenced by the following indicators are the scope of this study.

a. Sub-district Organization Position and Structure

As mentioned, Indonesia's regency/city governments followed Henry Mintzberg's (1979) organizational framework. Although LG policy does not define sub-district roles as operating core, technostructure, or supporting staff, The Explanation of the GR on LG Apparatus 2016 merely states that in the regency/city area, a sub-district is constituted as an LG working unit to provide local coordination functions and simple, high-intensity services. The Local Government Law 2014 establishes sub-districts to strengthen government administration, public services, and community empowerment in villages and urban villages. So, the sub-district is an operating core. Mintzberg (1979) calls the operating core a lower-level executor. It maintains inputs to be "produced" by the organization, transforms them into outputs, distributes them, and directly supports them. The operating core includes personnel directly generating or supporting the company's main products and services. Thus, the sub-district is an

LG operating core element that carries out territorial coordination functions and certain public services.

If the sub-district is the operating core, what government affairs are managed by the sub-district? All 32 government affairs under LG authority have been divided into the tasks of LG offices and agencies. The sub-district does not manage any of the LG affairs. So, does the sub-district carry out the tasks of the LG that have been divided into offices and agencies, or wait for orders from the regent/mayor as LG head? The 2016 GR on LG Apparatus does not explicitly define the organizational form of the sub-district. Therefore, the sub-district is different from Mintzberg's five LG institutions. The sub-district is only an LG working unit, like the GR on Sub-districts of 2018 states. The GR on Sub-districts does not mention the existence of territorial LG apparatus as mentioned in the GR on Regional Apparatus 2016. This lack of clarity has left regency/city and central governments needing clarification about the sub-districts' position. The revised Local Government Law should include the LG affairs focusing on sub-district tasks. The LG technical units at the sub-districts level also exacerbate this situation. The LG offices prefer to build technical units at the sub-district level rather than optimize the sub-districts role in assisting LG offices.

As indicated above, the sub-district organization highly depends on the regent/mayor. Because the regent/mayor determines the sub-districts existence and function, some sub-districts are "lucky" because the regent/mayor is highly committed to optimizing the sub-districts role. The *camat* receives a large delegation of authority, adequate budget support, and other support, such as human resource capacity, facilities, and infrastructure to carry out the authority. However, certain sub-districts are "unlucky" because the regent/mayor prioritizes sectoral development through LG offices and agencies. The sub-district needs more delegated authority, funding, and other support. The uncertainty of the sub-district position has forced the *camat* and sub-district staff to handle all matters in their working area, even if they don't have authority. This dependency also makes the *camat* a *political arm* of the regent/mayor to gather votes or promote a certain candidate for upcoming LG head, causing anomalies. The *camat's* backing of LG head candidates violates the civil servant's neutrality code of conduct. In Indonesia, a civil servant must be neutral in politics. In various regions, the *camat* was sanctioned by the Civil Servant Commission, responsible for maintaining civil servant neutrality, and has the authority to decide on violations of the civil servant code of ethics and conduct and submit its supervision results to the supervisor of a civil servant for follow-up.

b. Authority of Sub-district head (*Camat*)

The Local government law influences the authority of *camat*. Implementing Law No. 5/1974 did not address authority because the *camat* had full authority as sub-district head of the region. The *camat* is the sub-districts single ruler and the central government's representative; hence he has complete power to manage the government. The *camat* possesses "autonomy" in its region despite being subordinate to the regent/mayor. Because of this, the *camat* can decide everything inside the sub-district, and only major issues are consulted with the LG head (Kinseng, 2008). The village head is subordinate to the *camat* since the sub-district coordinates the LG apparatus and controls the village. Law No. 22/1999 made the *camat* an LG apparatus, which hampered its authority. The law also puts the sub-district in an adverse situation because the *camat* must wait for the regent/mayor's power to do his/her tasks. The regent/mayor's delegation determines the *camat's* authority. Law No. 32/2004 addressed this by granting the *camat* general government affairs. The *camat* has attributive authority from legislation and delegated authority from the regent/mayor.

GR No. 19/2008 on Sub-districts empowered the *camat* to manage community empowerment, public peace and order, law enforcement, public service infrastructure, facilities, and government activities at the sub-district level. In addition, the *camat* supports the village/urban village administration and provides community services that it cannot. The current Local Government Law 2014 upholds the *camat's* attributive tasks to organize general government affairs, carry out government affairs that LG apparatus work units in the sub-district level cannot handle, and conduct other tasks in accordance with laws and regulations. Sub-district operations require regent/mayor authority—basic services. Muslims (2017) observed in 10 regencies/cities in four provinces that the *camat* is not authorized to coordinate basic services like education and health; hence it operates poorly. Community health center data is unavailable to the *camat* due to limited access. The village government must verify this data to handle health issues quickly. The *camat* needs more power to investigate community health service complaints. Civil registration too. The *camat* collects papers but cannot print civil registry documents like ID cards. In other words, although the *camat* already has attributive authority, this cannot be optimized if it is not accompanied by delegated authority, especially in relation to interactions with the LG offices/agencies that administer certain services.

The delegation of authority to *camat* to carry out some government affairs is crucial because the LG offices and agencies have only been able to do so. The *camat* feels more confident and receives financial support for sub-district government concerns such as basic education and health. Sub-district stakeholders value the delegation of authority because it speeds up decision-making, improves service delivery, and affects budget efficiency. This delegated authority also helps ease the tasks of the regent/mayor because the *camat* is encouraged to make decisions and not always "ask for instructions" from their superiors. Delegating authority to the *camat* is vital, beneficial, and stipulated in-laws, although many regents/mayors still need to do so. Gunawan (2014) found that the regent/mayor still needs to give the *camat* delegated authority in most Indonesian regions. Regency/city governments focus on sectoral approaches and need to empower sub-districts as a territorial approach. 373 of 514 regencies and cities (72.6%) have approved delegation of authority policies, indicating that Gunawan's conditions are improving. Most have issued Regent/Mayor Regulations/Decrees, but they have yet to consider if financial support is needed to implement them. The delegation of authority policy data does not consider whether the delegated authority is the authority that should be delegated or just an effort to fulfill obligations by issuing policies, or whether the material of the delegated authority is an attributive task that does not need to be delegated to the *camat* anymore. Because the *camat* and sub-district staff cannot organize coordination meetings in urgent situations, discuss reports on basic service delivery with the service provider, or conduct field visits to determine community access to services, LG performance, such as basic service performance, could be higher. The regent/mayor typically asks the *camat* to establish basic services in the sub-district, especially if there are issues (Muslim, 2017).

c. Sub-district Planning and Budgeting

The sub-districts indecision as an LG structure has affected planning. The sub-district is an LG unit that manages a territorial area and its contents, including community activities. It is not an LG unit that carries out certain government affairs. Indonesian budget regimes are based on government affairs. Regency/city governments have offices and agencies. In contrast, the sub-district must plan like offices and agencies. This makes annual sub-district ceiling preparation difficult. Thus, "kindness of the regent/mayor" grants sub-district budgets. The sub-district budget covers only operational expenses. Budgets for sub-district programs and

activities are limited. The *camat* and staff need help coordinating governance, public services, and community empowerment. The *camat* must still participate in community activities that require funds, just as he did base on the previous law as stated in Law No. 5/1974. Sub-district budget support policies may be clearer. Law No. 23/2014 grants *Camat* a state budget for general government affairs, but the GR on Sub-districts 2018 as derivative regulation lacks a budget regulation. The GR says that general government affairs spending follows the rules and regulations. The GR should list law-regulated provisions. The sub-district has never received state funding for general government affairs. The central government had planned to provide sub-district funds, but it was never realized.

In an effort to overcome the planning and budgeting issue, The Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) issued Ministerial Regulation Number 90 of 2019 on the classification, coding, and nomenclature of regional development and financial planning, which lists sub-districts as LG units for territorial elements. This endeavor helps sub-districts in LG planning and budgeting. This regulation allows sub-districts to create and implement programs and activities to improve governance, public services, and community empowerment. However, executing this law needs an improvement in the *camat's* and staff's capacity to establish programs and activities to support the implementation of the *camat's* tasks optimally. Since 2020, the MoHA has socialized and supported regency/city governments executing the regulation. Due to technical advice, human resource capacity, and regional fiscal constraints, more regency/city governments are adopting the regulation in their yearly plans, but it has yet to be done on a large scale. Thus, the sub-district has yet to use this chance for planning and budgeting. Even if the sub-district can design programs and activities, the LG budget is restricted and must be available to fund them.

d. Implementation of the tasks of *Camat*

Authority strongly influences the *camat's* tasks. When forming a sub-district, the *camat's* main role is coordinating community empowerment activities, law enforcement, and public order. Coordination is so important that it determines the *camat's* and staff's success. Coordination mainly involves LG offices and agencies working at the sub-district level. Public services and village/urban village empowerment are further tasks. The village law's implementing provisions require the *camat* to foster and supervise the village government. Because public services demanded are mostly fundamental services like education and health, these two jobs and fostering and supervising villages are intimately tied to the coordination task. The *camat's* major task is coordination, including accelerating basic service minimum service standards (MSS). However, more than basic services policies are needed to assist the *camat's* attributive tasks in accelerating MSS. It seems to "hamper" *camat* tasks optimization. For instance, Minister of Health Regulation No. 75/2014 on community health centers removed the clause on cross-sector coordination between community health centers and sub-districts, but Minister of Health Regulation 43 of 2019 reinstated it. Only the Minister of Education and Culture Regulation No. 75/2016 on School Committees indicates that the *camat* supervises the school committee. GR No. 17/2010 on the Management and Implementation of Education said that *camat* honors outstanding teachers and education staff. *Camat* role ambiguity can limit MSS achievement for basic services.

Another trend is centralizing administrative services like civil registry and business license services in public service malls. The public service mall centralizes administrative functions in some locations, eliminating sub-districts. The Population and Civil Registration Office provides civil registry services through online applications. The community can obtain

services in a city without returning to the sub-district or Population and Civil Registration Office. Online applications and public service malls have made the *camat* less strategic in administrative services. The sub-districts are gaining authority, obligations, and functions beyond administrative services. LGs, especially sub-districts, face growing public demands for better services. The LG apparatus and sub-districts must respond to administrative and basic services.

Sub-district coordination tasks are also closely related to community empowerment and village government fostering and supervision, which are also carried out by other LG offices/agencies. The sub-district coordinates LG programs and activities with various offices and agencies to meet community requirements—the sub-district facilitates village debates and regulations. Community empowerment is another role. The role of community empowerment is seen as relevant to the sub-district regardless of its condition, both in rural and urban areas, both those that have implemented public service digitization and those that still provide manual services to their communities. The *camat's* role in promoting villages still benefits village governance.

e. Sub-district Performance Measurement

The sub-district has two meanings: as an LG unit and a region. Both in its position, no single standardized indicator is used to measure the performance of sub-districts applied nationally. However, LG and sub-district policies indicate that *camat's* tasks and authorities are expanding and enlarging to include attributive tasks and delegated tasks. The *camat's* tasks and authority have increased, raising community expectations for optimal performance. Sub-district performance is regularly highlighted. Some *camats* and staff believe they have done their best in government administration, including fostering and supervising village government, support development, and public services. However, community and village administrations continue to complain about sub-district performance. Each party needs a sub-district performance benchmark.

For public organizations such as sub-district, the performance review is a must. Public sector performance benchmarks relate to organizational success, which is complex. No single measure can represent performance thoroughly. Since 1999, Indonesia has used performance measurement to hold public agencies accountable. This policy applies to national and local government bodies (Suwanda, 2022). Traditionally, the performance of LG organizations has been judged based on inputs like the number of employees, budgets, laws, and regulations, as well as guidelines and technical instructions for how to implement them, rather than outputs like cost efficiency, service quality, range, and community benefits. So, it's important for the government and society to have indicators, clear, measurable performance standards, and tracking tools that can be accounted for in LG organizations. Performance reviews of LG organizations help the government, the legislature, and the people. In addition to making sure rules are followed, the government needs performance reviews to show how well it serves the community. It can help lawmakers decide how to judge the accountability report. The public is also interested in performance measurement because they have a right to know how well the government and its employees run things (Zainun, 2003). At the present time, the government's performance is under scrutiny from society. With the freedom to express opinions, there are many scathing criticisms of the government's performance (Winadio, Mamonto, Kandouw, 2023). Astrini (2013) says that performance measurement for regency/city governments helps find mistakes and flaws, improve performance, follow laws and rules, understand the needs and hopes of the community, and approve public services.

The GR on sub-districts 2018 does not expressly say that *camat* performance measurements are conducted on attributive tasks other than implementing general government affairs and other tasks in accordance with laws and regulations. Individual (*camat*) or organizational (sub-district) performance must be clarified. Assuming the *camat* is an official who receives a delegation of authority from the regent/mayor and has additional tasks, he can be assessed. However, the tasks of the *camat* are carried out by the *camat* and staff as an organizational unit. Therefore, the organization (sub-district) must also be examined. This performance review will emphasize the *camat* and sub-districts performance.

The Civil Servant Law (No. 5/2014) and the GR on the Sub-district of 2018 require the *camat's* performance to be evaluated based on the *camat's* attributive and delegated tasks. The *camat* also has additional tasks. In a state border area without a cross-border post, a *camat* helps the regent/mayor supervise immigration, customs, and quarantine. Performance metrics will closely match sub-district organizational indicators. These indicators will measure the *camat's* impact on the sub-district organization. The sub-district strategic plan and annual work plan must reflect the *camat's* authority and obligations. The *camat* then plans the sub-district staff work objective to complement the strategic and annual work plan. The amount to which sub-district activities are carried out, the results, the expenditures, and the impact will determine performance. This performance review must reference the sub-district strategic plan and annual work plan. The sub-district organizes government and development activities projects like these:

1. The sub-district implements its strategic and annual work plans. Thus, strategic and annual work plan targets determine performance.
2. Because the sub-district strategic plan and annual work plan must relate to the Regency/City Mid-Term Planning and the Regent/Mayor's vision and mission, the organizational level assessment can also measure effectiveness in supporting them.
3. Use the indication of support for national priority projects if the sub-district must attain them.

According to the GR on Sub-districts of 2018, a Minister of Home Affairs Regulation governs the technical aspects of sub-district performance measurements, including procedures, guidelines, what should be assessed, and the indicators used to assess. The Minister of Home Affairs had yet to issue the Ministerial Regulation. Since there are no established sub-district performance measurements, the *camat*, and staff must learn how to enhance their performance by simply completing their jobs. Because there is no technical rule on measuring sub-district performance, the regency/city government needs to assess the performance or optimize it accurately. Regents/mayors then develop their performance measurements sporadically and tailored to the interests of the regency/city government, such as awarding motorbikes to the best-performing sub-district as the largest collector of Land and Building Tax and viewing sub-district performance as good and ideal as seen from planned activities. Some LGs have chosen to refrain from measuring sub-district performance, as there is no guidance.

Discussion

As stated by Koning (2016), endogenous and exogenous factors affect institutional change (which in this study is called institutional dynamics). The human resources/staff, budget, and *camat* innovation cause sub-district institutional dynamics. Human resources are crucial for sub-districts, including the *camat*, secretary, section head, and all civil servants in the sub-district office. Sub-district staff must be sufficient and skilled to optimize tasks and functions. Studies show that staff quality affects sub-district effectiveness. Khairi (2009)

reported that most Sukmajaya Sub-district staff in Depok City, West Java, were senior high school graduates. Higher education improves sub-district staff abilities, mindsets, and performance. Education improves sub-district office staff effectiveness in Kerinci Regency, Jambi Province (Hastin & Jaya, 2014). Research on sub-district staff in Tegal City, Central Java Province, shows that education, work facilities, and leadership significantly impact performance, and increasing education will improve performance (Marimin, 2014). Sujana (2017) found that education level dominates service quality in the Sangkulirang Sub-district office, East Kutai District, East Kalimantan Province.

The institution's performance depends on the staff's quantity and competence. The sub-district staff must work harder to perform its obligations with the available staff. Sub-district staff in the country require better conditions. In 2014, Minister of Home Affairs Tjahjo Kumolo recommended 30 staff per sub-district. During a working tour to Yogyakarta, Klaten, and Surakarta, the Minister observed that sub-district staff averaged 17 (www.merdeka.com, December 11, 2014). The FGDs also noted that staff shortage, infrastructure, and funding hinder the *camat's* attributive and delegated tasks optimally (FGD-2, September 30, 2021).

However, the staff shortage is a typical issue that "should be accepted or given." For regions with adequate financial capability, like Tangerang City, providing casual daily workers helps overcome the sub-district's low staffing level. Pacitan and Lebak Regencies need more fiscal capacity to hire casual workers. Thus, the human resource problem becomes improving staff competence and optimizing tasks and functions. This includes *camat* credentials, sub-district office competency criteria, capacity building, and sub-district functional positions. Many *camat* still need to qualify. The regent/mayor must appoint the *camat* from civil servants who master the technical knowledge of government and meet the civil servant requirements in accordance with the provisions of laws and regulations according to the Local Government Law 2014. As the central government's representative, the governor will cancel a *camat* appointment that violates these provisions. Because regents/mayors appoint many *camat* without qualifications, this provision could be more effective. This happens because there are no suitable civil servants and because a regent/mayor has a political interest in placing his/her people who do not have a government background as *camat*. About 3,000 *camats* out of 7,230 (41%) lack government competence or experience.

Camat and sub-district staff competence also affect sub-district daily tasks and development planning. The *camat's* strategic position in coordinating development planning with villages, other LG units, and related vertical agencies, as well as government and private sector work programs and community empowerment activities in the sub-district level, has yet to be fully utilized. Only official forums have been used to coordinate multiple meetings to absorb goals and synergize program plans and activities. Due to the community's concrete demands and development and governance dynamics, sub-district programs and activity planning should be better. The expectation of synergistic LG programs and activities with offices, agencies, and village governments is especially true. The sub-district needs competency criteria for *camat* and staff who still need to meet qualifications. The central government recognizes this as a barrier to sub-district staff quality requirements. Sub-district roles have never been accredited and have no qualification standards. If standard competencies are lacking, the help mechanism has also failed. *Camats* learn by trial and error. Because the sub-districts staff needs to be improved, capacity-building initiatives are needed to optimize the available staff so the sub-district can perform its tasks and functions optimally. *Camat* and sub-district staff capacity-building has increased. However, some *camats* have never been trained.

To overcome the sub-district staff problem, the existence of functional position holders is very important. Government entities are moving from structural to functional human resources governance. A government master plan includes functional positions. Law on Civil Servant No. 5/2014 defines functional jobs as positions that provide functional services based on competence and skills. Civil servants must have relevant competence and abilities to fulfill these functional positions. Functional position-holders also must always upgrade their skills. The MoHA proposes functional jobs for sub-district staff. These functional jobs are expected to perform sub-district activities, including public service, community empowerment, and village fostering and supervision. The MoHA has developed an academic paper on establishing the functional position in the sub-district and submitted it to the Ministry of Administrative Reform, that in charge of forming functional positions. The Ministry of Administrative Reform is still discussing the academic paper with the MoHA. Functional position holders in the sub-district should dispel the perception of second-class staff. Thus, the remaining sub-district staff must be better qualified to do their jobs.

This study found that sub-district human resources/staff drive its dynamics, especially in planning, budgeting, and task execution. The sub-district budget referred to in this study is the budget allocation to fund the implementation of the *camat's* attributive and delegated tasks. Two attributive tasks that are interesting to discuss concerning this budget are the implementation of general government affairs and village fostering and supervision. The *camat* has long coordinated government administration in the sub-district, implementing general government affairs as required by Local Government Law 2014. Due to village-subdistrict contact, the *camat* automatically fosters and supervises the village. As previously stated, the budget allocation follows the organization's tasks and functions; therefore, the sub-district needs adequate money to carry out its strategic activities due to the *camat's* unclear government affairs task. The *camat's* tasks are funded, but much must be funded. The LG budget must be commensurate with the sub-districts needs. The *camat* must work efficiently due to a lack of funding. Dharmawan (2008) and Nugroho (2018) found that the *camat* needs a budget, legitimate authority, human resources, facilities, and infrastructure to perform well. Due to limited capacity, the budget must support *camat* tasks and sub-district staff capacity building. Local political elites still need to support the LG village community empowerment offices and *camat's* foster and supervise village budget, particularly in fiscally constrained regions. Thus, the foster and supervision village budget must adequately fund the LG village community empowerment office and *camat*. The vast number of provincial and regency/city governments that fund villages and civil society organizations shows this (Muslim, 2017). The *camat's* poor village foster and supervision may be one reason the state budget's Village Fund needs to be more utilized, and crucial village empowerment and independence agendas should be realized. The sub-district budget covers mostly operational and routine tasks. The regent/mayor delegated authority to the *camat* to get the sub-district a program budget. This delegation gives the sub-district a budget for education, health, public works, and social services. Regional fiscal constraints hinder this attempt.

From the above explanation, the budget appears to determine the institutional dynamics of the sub-district because it has a major impact on the *camat's* tasks, is the main reason for the regent/mayor's delegation of authority to the *camat*, and improves sub-district performance. The budget also impacts the income and welfare of sub-district staff, who are then required to perform well.

The dynamic of the subdistrict institution is also determined by the *camat's* innovative capacity. Some *camats* have developed innovative ways to carry out their tasks, such as efforts

to hold sub-district coordination meetings to ensure that out-of-school children return to school; pick-up services for civil registry provided by sub-districts for citizens who live far from the LG Population, and Civil Registration Office; and provision of a village clinic at the sub-district office for village governments who wish to consult on village governance. Moreover, during the Covid-19 pandemic, the *camats* took the initiative to carry out the annual village reporting process to the regent by utilizing online/virtual meetings via Zoom so that the reporting content was still conveyed. This includes efforts to utilize corporate social responsibility (CSR) funds to support the empowerment of the community. In addition, there are sub-districts that facilitate discussions on women, children, people with disabilities, and other vulnerable groups before the sub-district development planning discussion so that the aspirations of these vulnerable groups can be incorporated into development planning. The innovation of the *camat* ultimately contributed to LG's performance enhancement.

In addition to endogenous factors, exogenous factors that cause sub-district institutional dynamics are policies related to sub-districts, the role of sub-district supervisors, the commitment of regents/mayors, information technology, and area characteristics.

Policies related to sub-district are all national policies that have a relationship with sub-districts, such as Local Government Laws, Government Regulations, and Ministerial Regulations. These various policies have led to sub-district institutional dynamics. It is clear how the Local Government Laws change the position of the sub-district and the *camat*, the authority of *the camat*, the relationship between the *camat* and other stakeholders, sub-district planning and budgeting, and the performance of the sub-district itself. The significance of this policy is that the key stakeholders of the sub-district are the parties bound by the laws and regulations.

According to the argument, national policy related to sub-district affects institutional dynamics in all areas. The local government law has changed the sub-district from a reasonably independent area with the *camat* as a central government device to an LG device in decentralization. The LG apparatus regulation does not explicitly include the sub-district in one of Mintzberg's organizational forms, which is the basis for the LG apparatus, causing "confusion" in positioning the sub-district. The forming LG technical unit at the sub-district level has also created a "competition" between optimizing the sub-district and enhancing the sectoral approach. Policies also affected the *camat's* authority. From having full authority over the sub-district during the enactment of Law No. 5 of 1974, it drastically changed to the lowest level because it only received delegated authority from the regent/mayor based on Law No. 22 of 1999, then revised again by obtaining additional general government affairs via Law No. 32 of 2004, strengthened again by attributive, delegated, and implementing general government affairs in the sub-district area via Law No. 23 of 2014.

Sub-district planning and budgeting also affect sub-district institutions. Local government policies that only mention sectoral government affairs and do not account for territorial affairs cause problems in sub-district planning and budgeting because they only explicitly state that LG units' strategic plans and annual work plans are based on mandatory or optional government affairs. The sub-district has no responsibilities. Thus, the sub-district needs help creating a strategic and work plan. The sub-district budget is modest and depends on the "kindness of the mayor/regent." This was corrected with a policy on the codification, classification, and nomenclature of regional development and financial planning that allowed sub-districts to create programs and activities related to government and public service tasks; peace and public order; community empowerment; general government affairs; and village foster and supervision.

Policies also affect *camat* tasks. Sectoral policies, especially health and education policies, must assist the *camat*'s attributive tasks, especially those connected to achieving basic service minimum service standards. However, a section on *camat*-community health center collaboration for health services enhanced this. Changes in administrative service policies have also reduced *camat* responsibilities' importance in business licensing services.

Policies also affect sub-district performance measurement. The policy on sub-districts, which requires performance review, cannot be implemented due to a lack of standards. The MoHA is still working on a Minister of Home Affairs Regulation to control these precise recommendations. Policy changes must be well-communicated because they need adaptation and affect sub-district institutional dynamics (*interview with the Mayor of Tangerang City, April 27, 2021*).

Another exogenous factor is the role of the sub-district supervisor. The sub-district supervisor is the MoHA, specifically the Sub-Directorate of the Sub-district, the Directorate of Deconcentration, Assistance Tasks, and Cooperation, the Directorate General of Regional Administration, which facilitates sub-districts, and the Governor as the Central Government Representative. As a sub-district supervisor, the regent/mayor is not included in this research analysis because it is incorporated in another element: the commitment of the regent/mayor. Central government attention is less on sub-districts. The lack of attention from the central government can be seen from the Sub-Directorate of Sub-District, an echelon III official with two section heads (currently functional position holders) and five staff that hinders fostering 7,230 sub-districts in Indonesia. This echelon III position also affects the sub-district foster/facilitation budget of IDR 2.5 billion annually (USD 166,666). In contrast, villages receive much attention from the central government, provincial governments, and regency/city governments, even from the *camat* tasked with fostering and supervising the village. Villages are fostered by the Ministry of Villages, Development of Disadvantaged Regions, and Transmigration has a budget of IDR 2.99 trillion (USD 199,333,333), and the Directorate General of Village Governance, MoHA has a budget of IDR 145 billion (USD 9,666,666).

The MoHA has focused on coaching regents/mayors to maximize sub-districts' function by delegating authority to the *camat*. Another effort is training newly elected LG heads by providing a basic understanding that the core of government administration is not only a sectoral function but also a territorial function, where the position of sub-districts is very important to be played strategically to achieve LG development goals and providing best practices that have optimized government performance in their sub-districts. The Joint Circular on Sub-districts as Joint Houses for Facilitators and Extension Workers was another attempt. This Joint House is expected to synergize facilitators and outreach workers working independently utilizing distinct data to optimize *camat* function. The MoHA is also finalizing the Draft Minister of Home Affairs Regulation on regent/mayor delegation of authority to *camat*, and sub-district performance evaluation. The MoHA also proposes the establishment of functional positions for sub-district staff.

In addition to the MoHA, the Governor represents the Central Government as a sub-district supervisor. The governor fosters the *camat* through the regency/city government with provincial government apparatus. However, circumstances indicate that the provincial government should promote sub-districts. The provincial government's structure or function suggests it no longer fosters sub-districts. Some provincial governments promote sub-districts despite the need for a structural role. Through program synergy, the East Java and West Java Provincial Governments foster sub-district innovation through performance competitions.

These provincial governments can encourage regency/city governments to focus on sub-districts so they can win the competition.

The sub-district supervisor's job also affects institutional dynamics, particularly with the *camat's* authority, planning and budgeting, task implementation, and performance monitoring. The supervisor ensures the mayor/regent delegates authority to the *camat*. Although not optimal, the MoHA has provided socialization and technical advice. The governor should do the same to establish and supervise regency/city government. The Minister of Home Affairs Regulation on the codification, classification, and nomenclature of regional development and financial planning (No 90 of 2019) seeks to incorporate sub-district programs and activities into LG planning. As a supervisor, the Information System on Local Government (*Sistem Informasi Pemerintahan Daerah, SIPD* in Bahasa) was provided by the MoHA to support sub-district planning and budgeting.

The supervisor also creates institutional dynamics in sub-district tasks by providing technical guidelines and capacity building to the *camat* and staff, encouraging sub-district competitions and innovation, as practiced by the East Java and West Java Provincial Governments. Finally, sub-district performance measurement is affected by the supervisor. Local Government Law requires regency/city administrations to measure sub-district performance annually. However, they are still awaiting guidelines. The Minister of Home Affairs Regulation on regent/mayor delegation of authority to *camat* and sub-district performance evaluation is being finalized. Several provincial governments have used sub-district synergy competitions to gauge performance. Regency/city governments use provincial guidelines in several provinces to review sub-district performance.

Sub-district institutions also depend on regent/mayor commitment. The development of the regency/city shows this devotion. When the sectoral approach is more than territorial, sub-districts get less attention. On the contrary, territorial development gives sub-districts enough attention—delegating authority from regent/mayor to *camat* effectively with supporting components, especially the budget. The ability of regents/mayors to foster and function sub-districts varies per region. The regent/mayor can be normative, not delegating authority to the *camat* until the MoHA issues regulations, or creative, complying with regulations but providing budget support to follow the delegation of authority to *camat* (1st FGD, September 14, 2021). Research sites confirmed the regent/mayor's commitment. In Tangerang City, the *camat* coordinates many urban communities. The mayor has limited control span over the 104 urban village heads. Tangerang City's mayor sees the subdistrict as crucial to local administration and needs *camat* to work. As *camat* superior, the mayor encourages effective communication and knowledge sharing through meetings and WhatsApp groups. However, the same condition does not occur in other regions since the regent has delegated the authority to *camat*, but it has yet to be followed by the necessary support. However, more than the commitment of the mayor/regent is needed to delegate authority because it is not necessarily effectively implemented by the *camat*. This condition is related to whether or not there is budget support, human resources, and technical guidance to implement the delegated authority or obstacles due to conflicts with other regulations. The results of Wasistiono's study (2008) show several reasons that hinder the effective implementation of the delegation of authority policy, namely: 1) various local regulations governing the granting of business licenses and administrative services that have been in the hands of LG offices/agencies are not improved, resulting in overlapping regulations; 2) LG offices/agencies are not *relieved*, because they feel that some of their authority and also "sources of revenue" are taken by the *camat*; 3) there is insufficient budget and logistical support to carry out the authority effectively; and 4) the unavailability of adequate staff to carry out the

authority, because it is not accompanied by technical instructions or training from the relevant LG offices/agencies for staff who will carry out the delegated authority. On the contrary, the delegation of authority to the *camat* has been effective and has produced relatively optimal results because of the budgetary support to implement this authority. Implementing delegated authority has also significantly improved government administration and community services. Tangerang City has proven it. The ineffectiveness of the delegation of the regent/mayor's authority to *camat* is also triggered by the fact that there is no "force" for the regent/mayor to delegate authority because whether or not the delegation of authority is carried out is not included in the LG Implementation Report. The report is an instrument for obtaining Regional Incentive Funds for LGs.

The MoHA has several times proposed that the delegation of authority be included in the LG Implementation Report component to encourage regents/mayors to delegate their authority to *camat* but has yet to accommodate it. Another effort is to draft a Minister of Home Affairs Regulation on regent/mayor delegation of authority to *camat* to provide technical guidelines for regents/mayors, as mandated on the GR of the sub-district of 2018. When examined with institutional change, the delegation of authority is one of the causes of institutional change, which Knight, Miller, and Koning (2016) elaborate on as power distribution.

The *camat's* role has shifted from the sub-district head of the region to the LG apparatus, but the public image still needs to be. The *camat* is still seen as a leader who can solve all village/urban village, and sub-district problems. This is because Law 5/1974, which made the *camat* the sub-district head of the region and the sole ruler, was in effect for 25 years before Law No. 22/1999 replaced it, and the dogmatic New Order made the community used to see the *camat* as the leader. For example, if people in the sub-district are sick and want to be taken to the hospital and need to rent a car, they just come to *camat* and rely on his/her help. (*Prof. Sadu Wasistiono, local government expert, interviewed on March 18, 2021*). While some stakeholders also see the *camat* as an important figure closer to being the leader of the sub-district area, the presence of the *camat* is highly anticipated as the leader when there are activities in the village and urban village. When the *camat* comes, villagers feel honored. Muslim (2017) found that the regent always asks the *camat* to explain sub-district sectoral issues, even though the *camat* no longer participates in sectoral institutions' services. This public perception has contributed to the institutional dynamics of the sub-district, especially regarding the implementation of the *camat's* tasks. As explained earlier, because the public still views the *camat* as the sub-district head of the region, various matters that are no longer the *camat's* tasks are still placed on the shoulders of the *camat*. On the other hand, this public perception also encourages the *camat* to be more accepted by the community and village government so that the *camat's* tasks can be carried out smoothly. This public perception also forms a measure of the sub-district's performance. As someone seen as an important figure in their area, a *camat* who gets along well with the community, or makes donations when requested by the community, will be seen as having a positive performance in the public eyes.


Technological developments, especially information technology, have also contributed to sub-district institutions' dynamics. Implementing civil registry and *online* business licensing services has contributed to the increasing irrelevance of sub-districts in carrying out administrative services because the community can directly access services through available applications. Technological change is the cause of institutional dynamics, as stated by North, Alston, and Ferrie, elaborated by Koning (2016). Information technology can overcome distance and time barriers to community service. Information technology improves basic

schooling, health, and transportation services. The use of information technology has also begun to be practiced in the sub-district planning and budgeting process through the LG Information System application that requires the LG apparatus to enter their program planning proposals and activities in the application as subject to be verified and validated. Using this application can improve the quality of planning and budgeting for the LG development planning process, including sub-districts. This information technology is also an alternative to overcome limitations due to the Covid-19 pandemic while supporting learning efforts among sub-district staff.

Indonesia's subdistricts are different from one another in many ways. One of the things that makes a sub-district unique is whether it is in a rural area or an urban place. The way sub-district groups work is affected by these things about the area. People and social relationships are different in urban and rural places, especially those with a lot and a little of people. There will be different social relationships between the people and the government in cities (urban areas) than in regencies (rural places). Considering the differences between rural and urban areas, it is important to create sub-districts to fit the needs of the area. In urban places, like big cities, where growth has happened quickly, sub-districts can be weak because strengthening the sub-district creates bureaucratization. The role of the sub-district is minimized, only for providing basic services, while sub-district in rural areas is more active and have a bigger role (3rd FGD, October 19, 2021). Another perspective says that the sub-district institution is determined by whether or not it can be reached by the Internet. Access to the internet affects how services are digitized. After digitalization services, no need for people to come to the sub-district office because anyone can print anything online by themselves. So, how do these area features affect the right or best way for sub-district institutions to be set up? There are a few ideas that need more explanation.

The sector (LG offices and agencies) should reach out to urban areas to improve public services by bringing them closer to the community. But the sub-district is useful in rural areas, where the area could be more developed. In short, the sub-district organization in the city should be smaller than the regency. In this age of technology, official tasks done in a city's subdistrict can be sent straight to the office/agency. The sub-district can focus on community empowerment and monitoring, including keeping people safe, conflict resolution, and aspiration accommodation from the community. When looked at more closely, these area characteristic differences have affected how sub-district institutions work, especially in how the tasks of the camat are carried out. There are differences between how the tasks of the camat are carried out in urban and rural areas. Because of these regional differences, the planning and budgeting for a sub-district must also consider certain goals and processes.

Based on the explanation of the factors that cause sub-district institutional dynamics above, it can be concluded that *external/exogenous factors* contribute more to sub-district institutional dynamics than internal/endogenous factors, as shown in the following figure.



Source: processed by researchers, 2022

From the figure above, it appears that endogenous factors cause the dynamics of sub-district institutions, namely: a) The human resources/staff of the sub-district cause dynamics in the sub-district planning and budgeting process and the implementation of camat tasks; b) sub-district budgets cause dynamics in the planning and budgeting process and the implementation of camat tasks; and c) the creativity/innovation of the camat influences the sub-district planning and budgeting process; and the implementation of the camat's tasks.

Meanwhile, exogenous factors cause the occurrence of sub-district institutional dynamics in the form of a) the national policies related to sub-districts have led to various institutional dynamics, including organizational position and structure; authority of *camat*; sub-district planning and budgeting; implementation of the *camat's* tasks; and sub-district performance measurement; b) the role of the sub-district supervisor has led to changes in the authority of the *camat*; sub-district planning and budgeting; the implementation of the *camat's* tasks; and sub-district performance measurement; c) the commitment of the regent/mayor causes all the dynamics of the sub-district institution, which includes the position and structure of the sub-district organization; the authority of the *camat* (related to the delegation of authority); sub-district planning and budgeting; the implementation of *camat's* tasks; and sub-district performance measurement; d) public perceptions influence the implementation of *camat's* tasks and the sub-district performance measurement; e) information technology has led to changes in the sub-district planning and budgeting process; and the implementation of *camat's* tasks; and f) area characteristics lead to changes in sub-district planning, budgeting, and implementing *camat's* tasks.

Repositioning Sub-district Institutions in Indonesia's Local Government

The research results show the dynamics of sub-district institutions, highlighting the need to reposition them. This repositioning specifies the sub-districts optimum role in Indonesia's LG. According to research, the sub-district plays a key function and must be optimized. The territorial development concept reduces regent/mayor control to the village/urban village. This should meet sub-district community needs. This is also connected to

LG bureaucracy streamlining by decreasing technical units at the sub-district level and optimizing sub-district tasks. Thus, the institutional function of the sub-district is expanded. There will be efficiency, effectiveness, and budgeting, including the administration of the LG itself. Another opinion about the sub-district role is that LG should be given the flexibility to organize and manage sub-districts in accordance with the situation and context of their regions. It is related to the opinion that the sub-district is the responsibility of the regent/mayor, including whether or not it is necessary to delegate the authority to the *camat*. So, MoHA cannot make it fit for all.

Based on the results of the research analysis conducted, the ideal position and role of the sub-district can be formulated by combining the sectoral approach and the territorial approach and can also be formulated by considering area characteristics, namely rural and urban areas. Some views that emerged from the results of this research regarding sub-districts are as follows.

- a. The ideal role of the *camat* is to facilitate intelligently and develop smart villages. The sub-district needs to be empowered because it is the last bastion before entering the village that reduces sectoral and spatial egos. The *camat* must have territorial control, serve the people, not the superiors, and knit and synergize aspirations spatially (1st FGD, September 14, 2021).
- b. The sub-district also has the opportunity to bridge the meeting of the interests of the LG and the village government in terms of synchronizing the planning and regional spatial plan as well as building a channeling role for villages in terms of various assistance programs located in the sub-district and providing access to solutions to village problems (1st FGD, September 14, 2021).
- c. Sub-district as a basic service node by coordinating across sectors with LG offices and agencies and village governments. This is also in line with the attributive tasks of the *camat*, which is to facilitate the acceleration of minimum service standard achievement in their area (3rd FGD, October 19, 2021).
- d. It is necessary to encourage sub-districts to become the driving force in national economic recovery. Currently, the problem of the sub-district is the need for a playing field. Therefore, it is necessary to delegate authority, including in basic services, and this has been proven in several sub-districts so that it can be optimal. This means that if optimally empowered, sub-districts can contribute to handling problems at the regency/cities and village levels (3rd FGD, October 19, 2021).

The views above are related to the ideal position of sub-districts in regencies or rural areas. At the same time, sub-districts in urban areas (*cities*) are still seen as important and contribute to optimizing urban management.


- a. The need to synergize, a sectoral and territorial meeting, becomes very important. The hope is that the sub-district acts as a hub, which is a meeting between the demand side (the needs/interests of the community in the village/urban village) and the service delivery carried out by the offices/agencies, both in terms of planning and implementation that 'meet' in the sub-district (2nd FGD September 30, 2021).
- b. Sub-districts in urban areas are expected to play a greater role in organizing public services and are played as a space for handling public service complaints and community empowerment (interview with Mayor of Tangerang City, April 27, 2021).
- c. The functions of the sub-district that are still very relevant are as a space for complaints, coordination of public services outside of administrative services, and community empowerment (interview with Mayor of Tangerang City, April 27, 2021).

Based on the analysis of the research results regarding the dynamics of sub-district institutions and how to position the ideal sub-district in LG, the following three proposed models for sub-district institutions are 1) hybrid sub-district institutional model; 2) rural sub-district institutional model; and 3) urban sub-district institutional model.

a. Hybrid sub-district institutional model

This model seeks to accommodate and synergize a sectoral approach that focuses on LG offices/agencies and a territorial approach that gives relatively large attention to the sub-district as an LG apparatus. This model starts from the existing condition of the sub-district, which needs to be strengthened to carry out its tasks properly. This model seeks to ensure that the attributive and delegated tasks of the Camat can be carried out optimally, thus making a significant contribution to the implementation of LG. In this model, the sub-district becomes the *hub* between the regency/city government and the village government/urban village. The sub-district plays a strategic role through functional technical coordination with vertical agencies in the sub-district to carry out its attributive tasks, such as facilitating the sub-district leadership coordination forum in implementing general government affairs and public peace and order. The sub-district also facilitates cross-sector coordination meetings involving technical units or offices/agencies at the sub-district level and facilitates joint planning with village governments. Meanwhile, the sub-district coordinates functional and operational technology with other offices/agencies, including those in charge of administrative services.

In addition, to carry out its attributive and delegated tasks, the sub-district develops integrated services, which include an information and communication center (clearing house) for basic services; streamlining policies regarding the Sub-district Joint House for assistants and extension workers; carrying out administrative services and empowering village/urban village communities through the development of innovative communities. This sub-district integrated service will also perform tasks related to village guidance and supervision with technical offices/agencies. To carry out administrative services, the sub-district can perform tasks to socialize policies and services from the sub-district and other offices/agencies to the community, become the executor of some service processes, such as ID card recording or data collection of school-age children and stunting sufferers in their area, or become a supervisory team in business licensing issued by the office who in charge in the services. The sub-district integrated service is operated operationally by the sub-district staff as the technical supervisor of village government, sub-district service officers, and sub-district functional positions holders.




Source: processed by researchers, 2022

For this model to be operationalized, it requires the commitment of the regent/mayor to provide a portion of the development approach focused on the sectoral and territorial. This commitment is realized by delegating authority to the *camat*, supported by a sufficient budget to carry out the authority and adequate human resources. This model also assumes that the central government issues a policy on the functional position holders of sub-district to meet the need for human resources. The regent/mayor can encourage LG offices/agencies to place their staff in the sub-district as long as the policy has yet to be issued. Given that the scope of work of the sub-district is becoming broader, the *camat* and staff must have adequate competence. This can be realized by increasing the capacity of the *camat* and staff on an ongoing basis. This model will be very attractive to the *camat*, who has been hoping to have sufficient authority to move freely, and is relatively financially beneficial for the sub-district because it requires adequate budget support. Another implication is that there is no need for technical units at the sub-district level whose tasks can be handled by sub-district staff.

b. Rural area sub-district institutional model

In accordance with the characteristics of rural areas, which are geographically large and relatively homogeneous, this model seeks to ensure that the regent's span of control over village governments is sufficient through the role of the *camat*. In this model, the position of the *camat* to coordinate the sub-district area will be relatively close to the function as an extension of the regent at the sub-district level. The sub-district itself will be the spearhead of governance, development, and especially community services. The *camat* functions as a "vice-regent" in the sub-district area with a position at the level of a section head. His/her authority is expanded. His/her main tasks are to ensure that all programs and services that enter the village go through one sub-district door; coordinate all LG offices/agencies working in his/her area so that they do not overlap and can work together: work on behalf of the Regent, and become a channel for handling public service complaints. This is part of the effort to reduce the sectoral and spatial egos so far. The sub-district organizational structure is flat. The

camat is only assisted by the administration and finance section and the coordinator of functional position holders. Most civil servants working in the sub-district are functional position holders who handle internal sub-district affairs, basic service affairs, community empowerment, and fostering and supervision village. Sub-districts in rural areas can handle administrative services to bring services closer to the community because the digitization of services has yet to be implemented effectively. Through this model, the regency government's constraints to play the role of governance, development, service, and community empowerment can be overcome so that the community can feel the presence of LG, especially in areas relatively far from the regency capital.




Source: processed by researchers, 2022

This model requires a strong territorial approach the regent uses to administer the government, development, and public services. To be operational, the regent needs to delegate authority to the camat in relation to basic services and other government affairs that are deemed more effective in the sub-district by taking into account distance and accessibility of information technology. In this model, the sub-district plays a significant role in carrying out the tasks and functions of LG. The camat *becomes* the *alter ego* of the regent and optimizes its role as a fosterer and supervisor of the village government. This model requires staffing from other LG offices/agencies and suggests a reduction in the influence of offices/agencies with the strengthening of the role of the sub-district. Strong leadership and strategic direction from the regent are required to avoid "conflict" between the sub-district and other LG offices/agencies.

c. *Urban area sub-district institutional model*

This model is the opposite of the rural area model. This model can be applied in cities which geographically can be easily reached by the city government, where in urban areas or close to urban areas, various government activities, development, and public services can be carried out by LG offices/agencies which have clear tasks and functions in government affairs. In addition to the relatively close distance, access to the internet or information technology is also a criterion for implementing this model.



Source: processed by researchers, 2022

In the urban area model, there is a change in the tasks of camat and staff. The camat functions as an urban area manager with the focus of his/her tasks being community empowerment; assisting the poor and vulnerable groups; ensuring that citizens in his area have access to and adequate quality of public services; becoming a channel for complaints for people who have barriers to accessing information technology; and handling social conflicts. Administrative service functions can be directly handled by technical/service units through the help of information technology (applications and online). *Camat* is expected to synergize planning and cooperation with the private sector and other stakeholders to develop and perform services for urban areas. In addition, the camat also conducts joint planning and coordination of services with other LG offices/agencies to ensure that all urban residents can receive increased access and quality of public services, including the urban poor and vulnerable groups. The sub-district structure resembles the *street-level bureaucracy* in Shanghai, China, with a *flat* structure mostly filled by functional position holders. The *camat* is assisted by the administration and finance department and the coordinator of functional position holders. The organizational structure of the sub-district is lean/flat so that the decision-making process and communication channels are faster because few chains must be passed.

Certain strategies and steps are needed to achieve the ideal position of the sub-district, as described above. One that is considered important is *reframing the* role of the camat, reframing in the sense of looking back at the sub-district condition differently so that it can produce the best response by interpreting the sub-district according to its socioeconomic context. The role of the camat must be highlighted as facilitation, skill development, and accountability for policy and service implementation. This reframing of the role of the sub-district is important in implementing whatever sub-district institutional model is chosen, be it hybrid, rural, or urban.

The hybrid model can be applied by considering existing conditions and no radical changes in managing sub-districts in Indonesia, especially related to policies regarding LG. Therefore, the hybrid model is an effort to develop sub-districts based on existing conditions by emphasizing efforts to optimize sub-districts role in carrying out their attributive and delegated tasks, which are expected to contribute to improving the performance of LG.

But on the other hand, there is still room to design sub-districts according to their local context. For this, courage is needed so that the institutional design of the sub-district is in accordance with the regional context, in the sense of urban areas (cities) or rural areas (regencies). The courage to determine this design includes redesigning the role of the *camat* and sub-district. Tasks inappropriate for sub-districts in urban areas with adequate information technology do not need to be "forced" into the tasks of the *camat* and staff. Conversely, for rural areas, what is needed is an expansion of the tasks of the *camat*, specially delegated tasks to ensure that LG is present to meet the needs of the community.

References

- [1] Abdul-rahaman, B. A., & Adusah-karikari, A. (2019). The rhetoric and reality of development planning for rural development in ghana : the case of east gonja district in northern ghana. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 1–18.
- [2] Abdullah, M. T. (2014). Quo vadis of the organizational restructuring of local government. *Bisnis & Birokrasi, Jurnal Ilmu Administrasi Dan Organisasi*, 21(1), 58–64.
- [3] Adams, S., & Taabazuing, J. (2015). The promises and realities of Ghana's decentralization: a case study from the Wenchi district of Ghana. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 33(1), 88–104.
- [4] Adjei, P. O., Busia, A. K., & Bob-milliar, G. M. (2017). Democratic decentralization and disempowerment of traditional authorities under Ghana's local governance and development system : a spatio- temporal review. *Journal of Political Power*, 3803, 0.
- [5] Afridi, F. (2017). *Governance and public service delivery in India*. Synthesis paper. International Growth Centre.
- [6] Ahmad. (2016). Kinerja pegawai di kantor *camat* pinembani kabupaten donggala. *E-Jurnal Katalogis*, 4 (7), 26–35.
- [7] Ahsan, A. H. M. K., Chowdhury, M. S., & Panday, P. (2018). Do legal prescriptions ensure public accountability? Insights and lessons from local governments in Bangladesh. *Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration*, 40(1), 57–67.
- [8] Ahsan, A. H. M. K., & Panday, P. K. (2013). Problems of coordination in field administration in bangladesh: does informal communication matter? problems of coordination in field administration in bangladesh: does informal communication matter? *International Journal of Public Administration*, 0692(36:8), 588–599.
- [9] Barasa, E. W., Manyara, A. M., Molyneux, S., & Tsofa, B. (2017). Recentralization within decentralization: county hospital autonomy under devolution in Kenya. *PLoS ONE*, 12(8), 1–19.
- [10] Blom-hansen, J., & Houlberg, K. (2014). Size, democracy, and the economic costs of running the political system. *American Journal Of Political Science*, 58(4), 790–803.
- [11] Boone, C., Dyzenhaus, A., Manji, A., Gateri, C. W., Ouma, S., Owino, J. K., Gargule, A., & Klopp, J. M. (2019). Land law reform in kenya: devolution, veto players, and the limits of an institutional fix. *African Affairs*, 1(16), 215–237.
- [12] Buchenrieder, G., Dufhues, T., Theesfeld, I., & Nuchanata, M. (2017). Participatory

- local governance and cultural practices in Thailand. *Cogent Social Sciences*, 32(1), 1–19.
- [13] Bungin, B. (Ed.). (2003). *Metodologi penelitian kualitatif: aktualisasi metodologis ke arah ragam varian kontemporer*. Jakarta: PT. Radja Grafindo Persada.
- [14] Bunnell, T., Miller, M. A., Phelps, N. A., & Taylor, J. (2013). Urban development in a decentralized indonesia: two success stories?. *Pacific Affairs*, 86(4), 857–876.
- [15] Campenhout, B. Van, Bizimungu, E., Smart, J., & Kabunga, N. (2018). Development in practice impact pathways of a participatory local governance initiative in uganda: a qualitative exploration. *Development in Practice*, 28(8), 1046–1056.
- [16] Channa, A., & Faguet, J. (2016). *Decentralization of Health and Education in Developing Countries: A Quality- Adjusted Review of the Empirical*.
- [17] Cheema, G.S., & Rondinelli, D.A. (Ed.). (2007). *Decentralizing governance: emerging concept and practices*. Washington D.C: Ash Institute for Democratic Governance and Innovation, Harvard University.
- [18] Chen, A. (2014). How has the abolition of agricultural taxes transformed village governance in china? evidence from agricultural regions. *The China Quarterly*, August, 715–735.
- [19] Chikulo, B. C. (2014). Decentralization reforms in zambia 1991-2010. *Journal of Social Sciences*, 40(1), 95–105.
- [20] Cho, E. J. (2017). Tackling local problems by embedding design in local administrative offices: a case study of the ‘design consultant’ program. *The Design Journal*, 6925, S3507–S3515.
- [21] Chung, Y. (2018). Continuity and change in chinese grassroots governance: shanghai’s local administrative system. *Issues & Studies*, 54(4), 1–28.
- [22] Cobban, T. W. (2019). Bigger is better: reducing the cost of local administration by increasing jurisdiction size in ontario, canada, 1995 – 2010. *Urban Affairs Review*, 55(2), 462 –500.
- [23] Cohen, J.M., & Peterson, S.B. (1999). *Administrative decentralization: strategies for developing countries*. Connecticut: Kumarian Press.
- [24] Conyers, D. (1986). Decentralization and development: a framework for analysis. *Community Development Jurnal*, Vol. 21 Number 2.
- [25] Copus, C., & Steyvers, K. (2017). Local leadership and local self-government: avoiding the abyss. *Lex Localis - Journal Of Local Self-Government*, 15(1), 1–18.
- [26] Creswell, J.W. (1994). *Research design: qualitative & quantitative approaches*. California: Sage Publication.Inc.
- [27] Datta, U. K. (2018). State- owned fund raising entrepreneurship at local government of bangladesh for socio- economic development. *Delhi Business Review*, 19(1), 1–17.
- [28] Denzin, N.K., & Lincoln, Y.S. (2000). *The SAGE handbook of qualitative research* (3rd ed.). London: Sage Publications, Inc.
- [29] Diefenbach, T. (2016). Empowerment of the few and disempowerment of the many- disempowerment in thai ‘one tambon one product’ organisations (otops). *The South East Asian Journal of Management*, 10(1), 30–54.
- [30] Dufhues, T., Theesfeld, I., & Buchenrieder, G. (2014). The political economy of decentralization in thailand : how past and present decentralization affects rural actors’ participation. *European Journal of Development Research Vol.*, 27(5), 793–810.
- [31] Eaton, J.W. (1972). *Institution building and development, from concept to application*. Beverly Hills, London: Sage Publications.

- [32] Eka. (2017). Kualitas pelayanan publik di kantor *camat* rumbai pesisir. *Jurnal Niara*, 9 (2).
- [33] Emmenegger, R. (2016). Decentralization and the local developmental state: peasant mobilization in oromiya, ethiopia. *Africa*, 86(2), 263–288.
- [34] Erlingsson, G. Ó., & Ödalen, J. (2013). How should local government be organised? reflections from a swedish perspective. *Local Government Studies*, 39:1(November 2013), 37–41.
- [35] Faguet, J. (2018). Transformation from below in bangladesh. *Modern Asian Studies*, 6, 1668–1694.
- [36] Forkuor, D., & Adjei, P. O. W. (2016). Analysis of prospects and challenges of sub-district structures under analysis of prospects and challenges of sub-district structures under ghana’s local governance system. *Journal of Sustainable Development*, 9(3), 147–159.
- [37] Frederickson, G.H., & Smith, K.B. (2003). *The public administration theory primer*. UK: Westview Press.
- [38] Garrick, D. E. (2019). Decentralisation and drought adaptation applying the subsidiarity principle in transboundary river basins. *International Journal of the Commons Decentralisation*, 12(1), 301–331.
- [39] Gassner, D., & Gofen, A. (2018). Street-level management: a clientele-agent perspective on implementation. *Journal of Public Administration Research And Theory*, 551–568.
- [40] Goodin, R.E. (Ed.). (1996). *The theory of institutional design*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- [41] Grindle, M.S. (Ed.). (1997). *Getting good government, capacity building in the public sectors of developing countries*. USA: Harvard University Press.
- [42] Grossman, G., & Lewis, J. I. (2014). Administrative unit proliferation. *American Political Science Review*, 108(1), 196–217.
- [43] Hidayat, D.N. (2003). *Paradigma dan metodologi penelitian sosial empirik klasik*. Jakarta: Departemen Ilmu Komunikasi FISIP Universitas Indonesia.
- [44] Hlynisdóttir, E. M. (2018). Autonomy or integration: historical analysis of the debate on the purpose of icelandic local self-government. *Icelandic Review of Politics and Administration*, 14(1), (83-100).
- [45] Hoessein, B. (1993). Berbagai faktor yang mempengaruhi besarnya otonomi daerah tingkat ii, suatu kajian desentralisasi dan otonomi daerah dari segi ilmu dan administrasi. *Disertasi Pascasarjana UI*
- [46] Home, R. (2019). From cantonments to townships: lugard’s influence upon british colonial urban governance in africa. *Planning Perspectives*, 34(1), 43–64.
- [47] Hong, S. (2017). What are the areas of competence for central and local governments? accountability mechanisms in multi-level governance. *Journal of Public Administration Research And Theory*, Tiebout 1956, 120–134.
- [48] Hou, L., Liu, M., Yang, D. L., & Xue, J. (2018). Of time, leadership, and governance: elite incentives and stability maintenance in china. *Governance*, 31, 239–257.
- [49] Iaquinta, D.L., & Drescher, A.W. (2000). Defining periurban: rural-urban linkages and institutional connections.
- [50] Islam, R., & Walkerden, G. (2017). Social networks and challenges in government disaster policies: a case study from bangladesh. *International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction*, 22(February), 325–334.

- [51] Khairi, A. (2010). Analisis pemberdayaan peran dan fungsi camat. *Bisnis & Birokrasi, Jurnal Ilmu Administrasi Dan Organisasi*, 17, 160–169.
- [52] Khan, M. S. (2017). Institutional design variance in local governments across pakistan: what has social capital got to do with it? *Pakistan Perspectives*, 22(1), 43–71.
- [53] Khongsatjaviwat, D., & Routray, J. K. (2015). Local government for rural development in thailand. *International Journal of Rural Management*, 11(1), 3–24.
- [54] Kia, T. T. (2019). Contemporary local governance and indigenous institutions: the case of the Sidaama, Southern. *Africa Review*, 11(1), 77–94.
- [55] Kirlappos, A. (2017). Local government in the republic of cyprus : path dependent europeanization. *The Cyprus Review*, 29,.
- [56] Koprić, I. (2016). Decentralization as a precarious component of contemporary european governance. *The NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy*, IX(1).
- [57] Krause, R. M., Feiock, R. C., & Hawkins, C. V. (2016). The Administrative organization of sustainability within local government. *Journal of Public Administration Research And Theory*, 113–127.
- [58] Kuenzi, M. T., & Lambright, G. M. S. (2018). Decentralization , executive selection , and citizen views on the quality of local governance in african countries. *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, 49(2), 221–249.
- [59] Kundo, H. K. (2018). Citizen’s charter for improved public service delivery and accountability: the experience of land administration at the local government. *International Journal of Public Administration*, 41(3), 226–237.
- [60] Kurniawan, I. (2011). Implementasi pelimpahan sebagian wewenang bupati bidang kesehatan di kecamatan margahayu kabupaten bandung (studi kasus pada layanan perizinan depot isi ulang air minum mineral). *Jurnal Ilmu Administrasi*, 8(2), 159–171.
- [61] Ladner, A. (2016). Administrative reforms in swiss municipalities over the last twenty years – the end of new public management? *Lex Localis - Journal Of Local Self-Government*, 14(2), 185–207.
- [62] Leemans, A.F. (1976). *The management of change in government*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
- [63] Lelo, L., Pandie, D., & Tamunu, L. (2016). Implementasi kebijakan pembangunan kelembagaan pemerintah kecamatan sebagai perangkat daerah (studi di kota kupang dan kabupaten sikka). *Jurnal Ilmiah Ilmu Administrasi Publik*, 6(1), 1.
- [64] Lewis, B. D. (2017). Does local government proliferation improve public service delivery? Evidence from Indonesia. *Journal of Urban Affairs*, 39(8), 1047–1065.
- [65] Lidström, A., & Madell, T. (2018). Adjusting to international standards : has sweden learned from the european charter of local self- government? *Lex Localis - Journal Of Local Self-Government*, 16(4), 951–969.
- [66] Liu, H., & Raine, J. W. (2016). Why is there less public trust in local government than in central government in china? *International Journal of Public Administration*, 39(4), 258–269.
- [67] Lorsuwannarat, T. (2017). Public participation in budgeting : the new path of budget reform in thailand. *International Journal of Public Administration*, 40(5), 385–400.
- [68] Lu, Y., Routray, J. K., & Ahmad, M. M. (2019). Multidimensional poverty analysis at the local level in northwest yunnan province , china : some insights and implications. *Journal of Poverty*, 23(4), 299–316.
- [69] Ma, D., & Pang, M. R. (2017). The rise and fall of electoral democracy : a social

- evolutionary approach to direct election experiments in local china. *J Of Chin Polit Sci*, 22, 601–624.
- [70] Maksun, I.R. (2014). Pemerintahan umum berbasis dekonsentrasi. *Jurnal Ilmu Pemerintahan* Edisi 44 Tahun 2014.
- [71] Maksun, I.R. (2015). *Perbandingan sistem pembagian urusan pemerintahan antara pemerintah pusat dan daerah otonom*. Laporan Penelitian. DSF-Bank Dunia.
- [72] Margono. (2013). Pengembangan organisasi kecamatan dalam penyelenggaraan pemerintahan daerah di kecamatan tenggarong, kabupaten kutai kartanegara. *Jurnal Paradigma*, 2(1), 47–61.
- [73] Maswikwa, B., Gouws, A., Gordon, S. F. (2018). Constructing citizenship and identity : exploring political participation amongst black african women from zimbabwean and south african townships. *Politikon*, 45(3), 335–351.
- [74] Mezgebe, D. (2015). Decentralized governance under centralized party rule in ethiopia : the tigray experience. *Regional & Federal Studies*, 25(5), 473–490.
- [75] Mintzberg, H. (1979). *The structuring of organizations*. New York: Prentice Hall.
- [76] Mohammed, A. K. (2016). Decentralization and participation : theory and ghana’s evidence. *Japanese Journal of Political Science*, 17(2), 232–255.
- [77] Müller, A. (2019). *Public services and informal profits : governing township health centres in a context of misfit regulatory institutions* .
- [78] Muluk, M.R.A. (2009). *Peta konsep desentralisasi & pemerintahan daerah*. Surabaya: ITS Press & Lembaga Penerbitan & Dokumentasi FIA-UNIBRAW
- [79] Muslim, E. (2017). *Meningkatkan Pelayanan Dasar Lini Depan, Menggagas Penguatan Peran Kecamatan dan Unit Layanan di Kecamatan*.
- [80] Neuman, W.L. (2003). *Social research methods: qualitative and quantitative approaches*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon Peason Education, Inc.
- [81] Ngubane, C. (2014). Occupying umlazi: hesitant steps towards political ideology in a durban township. *Politikon*, 41(3), 355–370.
- [82] Nordholt, N.S. (1987). *Ojo dumeh: kepemimpinan lokal dalam pembangunan*. Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan.
- [83] North, D.C. (1990). *Institutions, institutional change and economic performance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- [84] Norton, A. (1994). *International handbook of local and regional government: a comparative analysis of advanced democracies*. UK: Edward Elgar.
- [85] Nudzor, H. P. (2014). An analytical review of education policy- making and implementation processes within the context of “ decentralized system of administration ” in ghana. *SAGE Open*, 1 –11.
- [86] Nugroho, A., Supriyono, B., Domai, T., & Muluk, M. R. K. (2019). Realizing the effectiveness of districts administration at the government of pandeglang regency, banten province, indonesia. *Journal of Public Administration Studies*, 1(4), 19–25.
- [87] Nurcholis, H. (2007). *Teori dan praktik pemerintahan dan otonomi daerah*. Jakarta: Gramedia Widiasarana Indonesia.
- [88] Opare, S. (2015). Examining the sub-structures of ghana’s local government system under the decentralization program: performance and prospects. *Current Politics and Economics of Africa*, 8(3), 381–405.
- [89] Osavelyuk, A. M., Munkueva, S. A., Tipaeva, L. V., Dorzhiev, J. B., & Namzhilon, A. B. (2015). Theoretical base of delegation of some state authority of territorial entities of the russian federation to local self-government bodies. *Mediterranean Journal of Social*

- Sciences*, 6(5), 239–248.
- [90] Ostwald, K., Tajima, Y., & Samphantharak, K. (2016). Indonesia's decentralization experiment consequences. *Journal of Southeast Asian Economies*, 33(2), 139–157.
- [91] Pambudi, Y. S., Diamantina, A., & Wisnaeni, F. (2017). Pelimpahan wewenang bupati kepada *camat* dalam rangka otonomi daerah di kabupaten cilacap ditinjau dari undang – undang nomor 23 tahun 2014 tentang pemerintahan daerah. *Diponegoro Law Journal*, 6, 1–11.
- [92] Panday, P. (2017). Decentralisation without decentralisation: Bangladesh's failed attempt to transfer power from the central government to local governments. *Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration*, 6665, 1–12.
- [93] Patton, M.Q. (2002). *Qualitative research and evaluation methods* (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, Inc.
- [94] Poole, E. G. (2019). How institutional culture trumps tier effects : evidence from government responsiveness to foi requests. *Journal of Public Administration Research And Theory*, August 2018, 210–226.
- [95] Qiao, Y., Martin, F., He, X., Zhen, H., & Pan, X. (2019). The changing role of local government in organic agriculture development in Wanzai County, China. *Canadian Journal of Development Studies*, 40(1), 64–77.
- [96] Rahman, M. S. (2013). Role of the members of parliament in the local government of bangladesh : views and perceptions of grassroots in the case of upazila administration. *Public Organiz Rev*, 13, 71–88.
- [97] Rauf, R., Nurman, Zakaria, S. Z. S., & Arifin, K. (2016). Trend analysis of operation: Local governance perspectives in Indonesia. *Koganei*, 19(6A), 1729–1736.
- [98] Reddy, M. G. (2017). Decentralized governance and devolution of funds to the panchayats in india : a critical analysis of two states. *Studies in Indian Politics*, 5(1), 42–54.
- [99] Rinfret, S., Barsky, C., & Scott, S. (2018). Public perceptions, elections administration, and the role of street level bureaucrats. *Public Administration Quarterly*, 42(4).
- [100] Samanta, D., & Nayak, N. C. (2015). Development in practice determinants of people's participation : a study of rural west bengal, india. *Development in Practice*, 25(1), 71–85.
- [101] Santiasih, N.W. (2013). Pengaruh kompetensi pegawai terhadap kinerja pegawai di kantor *camat* pupuan kabupaten tabanan tahun 2012. *Jurnal Pendidikan Ekonomi Undiksha*. <https://ejournal.undiksha.ac.id/index.php/JJPE/article/view/1238>
- [102] Sartorius, K., & Sartorius, B. K. D. (2013). A spatial model to quantify the mortality impact of service delivery in Sub-Saharan Africa : an ecological design utilizing data from South Africa. *International Journal of Health Geographics*, 12(1), 1.
- [103] Sembiring, M. (2012). Pelaksanaan tugas kecamatan guna memberdayakan pemerintah sebagai pusat pelayanan masyarakat. *MIMBAR, Jurnal Sosial Dan Pembangunan*, 28(1), 1.
- [104] Shi, Y. (2016). The Rise of specialized governance in american federalism: testing links between local government autonomy and formation of special district governments. *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, 47(1), 99–130.
- [105] Slack, E., & Bird, R. (2013). Does municipal amalgamation strengthen the financial viability of local government? a canadian example. *Public Finance and Management*, 13(2), 99–123.

- [106] Smith, B.C. (1985). *Decentralization, the territorial dimension of the state*. London: George Allen & Unwin.
- [107] Sok, S., Yu, X., & Yila, O. (2014). Decentralized local institutions and livelihood development of riverine communities in the Lower Mekong Basin, Cambodia. *Journal of Asian Public Policy*, 7(3), 275–290.
- [108] Spicer, Z., & Found, A. (2016). Thinking regionally: how to improve service delivery in Canada's cities. *Commentary*, 458.
- [109] Storey, A. (2014). Making experience legible: spaces of participation and the construction of knowledge in khayelitsha. *Politikon*, 41(3), 403–420.
- [110] Sudhipongpracha, T. (2015). Decentralizing decentralized governance: community empowerment and coproduction of municipal public works in Northeast Thailand. *Community Development Journal* Vol, 51(2), 302–319.
- [111] Sugiyono. (2005). *Memahami penelitian kualitatif*. Bandung: Alfabeta.
- [112] Suparman, N. (2017). Evaluasi kebijakan pelimpahan sebagian kewenangan bupati kepada camat di kecamatan sagala herang kabupaten subang tahun 2015. *Politik Indonesia: Indonesian Political Science Review*, 2(2), 159.
- [113] Susanto, J., & Anggraini, Z. (2019). Kualitas pelayanan publik pada kantor camat tabir ulu kabupaten merangin. *Jurnal Administrasi Negara*, 25(2).
- [114] Suwanda, Bernardus Yulianto Nugroho. (2022). Literature reviews: McKinsey 7S model to support organizational performance. *Technium Social Sciences Journal*, Vol. 38, 1-9.
- [115] Syekh, S. (2019). Pengaruh pendidikan dan pengalaman kerja terhadap kinerja pegawai di kantor camat tunggal ilir kabupaten tanjung jabung barat. *J-MAS (Jurnal Manajemen Dan Sains)*, 4(1), 102.
- [116] Tao, H., Huang, Z., & Ran, F. (2018). Rural tourism spatial reconstruction model from the perspective of atv: a case study of mufu township. *Sustainability*, 10(2657), 1–16.
- [117] Theesfeld, I. (2017). The effects of rules on local political decision-making processes: How can rules facilitate participation? *Policy Sciences*, 50(4), 675–696.
- [118] Tomuka, S. (2013). Penerapan prinsip-prinsip good governance dalam pelayanan publik di kecamatan girian kota bitung (studi tentang pelayanan akte jual beli). *Jurnal Eksekutif*, 2(1), 1–15.
- [119] Tso, Y., & Li, P. (2018). Lighting up communities: the worship streetlamp project in Luodong Township. *Policy Studies*, 39(5), 515–534.
- [120] Turiel, J., Cunningham, E., & Saich, A. (2019). To serve the people: income, region and citizen attitudes towards governance in China (2003–2016). *The China Quarterly*, 1–30.
- [121] Uddin, M. N. (2013). Towards good urban local governance in Bangladesh: lessons learnt from Japanese local government system to overcome the challenges. *Lex Localis - Journal Of Local Self-Government*, 11(4), 933–953.
- [122] Unger, D., & Mahakanjana, C. (2016). Decentralization in Thailand. *Journal of Southeast Asian Economies* Vol., 33(2), 172–188.
- [123] Urinbojev, R. (2015). Local government capacity in post-soviet central Asia. *Public Policy And Administration*, 14(3), 177–199.
- [124] Vale, H. F. Do. (2013). Local government reforms in federal Brazil, India and South Africa: a comparative overview. *Lex Localis - Journal Of Local Self-Government*, 11(3), 453–470.

- [125] Vale, H. F. Do. (2015). Comparing and measuring subnational autonomy across three continents. *Lex Localis - Journal Of Local Self-Government*, 13(3), 741–764.
- [126] Vlahos, N. (2013). The politics of subnational decentralization in France, Brazil, and Italy. *Journal of Public Deliberation*, 9(2).
- [127] Vu, T. T., Zouikri, M., & Deffains, B. (2014). The interrelationship between formal and informal decentralization and its impact on subcentral governance performance: the case of vietnam. *CESifo Economic Studies*, 60(February), 613–652.
- [128] Waheduzzaman, W., & Alam, Q. (2015). Democratic culture and participatory local governance in Bangladesh. *Local Government Studies*, 41(2), 260–279.
- [129] Waheduzzaman, W., & As-saber, S. (2015). Community participation and local governance in Bangladesh. *Australian Journal of Political Science*, 0(0), 1–20.
- [130] Wasistiono, S., Nurdin, I., & Fahrurozi, M. (2009). *Perkembangan organisasi kecamatan dari masa ke masa*. Bandung: Fokusmedia.
- [131] Wee, J. S., Phang, S. N., & Khalil, S. (2018). Re- thinking government administration: issues of decentralization, public service innovation and transformation in Malaysia. *International Journal of Management Research & Review*, 8(3), 7–17.
- [132] Wheeland, C. M., & Smith, G. G. (2013). Manager effectively managing ethical dilemmas. *Public Integrity*, 15(3), 265–282.
- [133] Wilde, M. de, Hurenkamp, M., & Tonkens, E. (2014). Flexible relations , frail contacts and failing demands : How community groups and local institutions interact in local governance in the. *Urban Studies*, 51(16), 3365–3382.
- [134] Winadio, S.Y., Fitri Mamonto & Selphius Kandouw. (2023). The apparatus performance of the tataaran satu urban village office, south tondano sub-district, minahasa regency. *Technium Social Sciences Journal*, Vol. 39, 48-58.
- [135] Yin, R.K. (2003). *Case study research: design and methods* (3rd ed.). London: Sage Publications, Inc.
- [136] Yu, J., Li, L., & Shen, Y. (2016). Rediscovering intergovernmental relations at the local level: the devolution to township governments in zhejiang province. *The China Review*, 16(2), 1–26.
- [137] Yuen, S. (2018). Negotiating service activism in china : the impact of NGOs’ institutional embeddedness in the local state. *Journal of Contemporary China*, 0564, 1–17.
- [138] Yukalang, N., Clarke, B. D., & Ross, K. E. (2017). Solid waste management in Thailand: an overview and case study (Tha Khon Yang sub-district). *Rev Environ Health*, 32(3), 223–234.
- [139] Zhang, Y., Yang, S., & Wang, W. (2013). Study on township space management planning for rural context based on GIS technique. *2013 21st International Conference on Geoinformatics*, 1–5.
- [140] Zhu, J. (2017). Making urbanisation compact and equal: Integrating rural villages into urban communities in Kunshan, China. *Urban Studies*, 54(10), 2268–2284.
- [141] Zhumashov, Y. (2016). Rural local government system in kazakhstan: recent issues. *International Review of Management and Marketing*, 6(August 2013), 211–220.